Folly in Fordo: Iran’s nuclear weapons programme
By Will Holmes
On 27 November 2020, an Iranian nuclear scientist named Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was travelling east from Tehran to his weekend villa in Absard. Aside from its bountiful fruit orchards, the city of Absard is best known for its luxury villas which, come weekend, house the Iranian government’s ruling elite (imagine Chipping Norton, but hotter). While enroute however, Fakhrizadeh’s chauffeured car passed a stationary pickup truck. Nestled in the bed of that pickup was a remote-controlled machine gun which, once its AI software had recognised the target, opened fire.
Fakhrizadeh is just one of several Iranian nuclear scientists to have encountered a grim fate. For nearly two decades, the Israeli intelligence services have been targeting scientists in an effort to curb Iran’s nuclear weapon programme. That same effort was met with bad news earlier this month. On 28 February, inspectors from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Iran’s Fordo nuclear site found uranium particles enriched to 83.7%, just short of the 90% required for weaponization.
Under the now defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed not to enrich Uranium beyond 3.67%, a sufficient level for the majority of civilian uses. Since President Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018, Iran has gradually increased the level to which they enrich uranium. In 2022, the Iranian government began enriching uranium to 60%. The gap between 0 and 5% enrichment is the most difficult stage of the enrichment process. Beyond this, increasing enrichment is achieved with relative ease.
The revelation that Iran has enriched uranium to 83.7% is cause for concern, but not panic. The IAEA announcement does not specify how much uranium has been enriched to this level, instead referring only to “particles.” Iran meanwhile has argued that the detection of the highly enriched uranium is merely an unintended side effect of achieving 60% enrichment. Moreover, even if Iran did have a secret stockpile of weaponised uranium, it would still need to develop a detonator and a delivery system for any warhead. Since the IAEA’s discovery, US intelligence agencies have reiterated their assessment that Iran has not decided to resume their nuclear weapon programme.
Demonstrating its nuclear enrichment capabilities will, Iran hopes, provide the world a reason to take a seat at the negotiating table
Nonetheless, Iran has gradually been increasing both the quantity and quality of its uranium. Inspections mandated by the JCPOA have been restricted, and the time it would take for the Islamic Republic to attain a weapon has been greatly reduced. Most analysts over the past twelve months have viewed these provocative steps as a bargaining tool. After being ravaged by the one-two punch of sanctions and Covid-19, the Iranian economy is in a dire state. Demonstrating its nuclear enrichment capabilities will, Iran hopes, provide the world a reason to take a seat at the negotiating table and lift economic sanctions.
Iran’s strategy risks destabilising the region. First there is the long term threat to non-proliferation in the Middle East. The prospect of an Iranian bomb will motivate others in the region to seek a nuclear deterrent. The most likely suspects are Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of whom have been engaged in proxy conflicts with Iran and its Revolutionary Guard Corps. Although neither country currently possesses the infrastructure or the expertise required to build a bomb, they have more than enough cash to buy both.
The prospect of an Iranian bomb will motivate others in the region to seek a nuclear deterrent
The acute risk comes from Israel. Iran’s nuclear progress in spite of Israeli espionage has led some in Jerusalem to question the current strategy. Addressing the Iranian people earlier this month, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned that the world risked nuclear war with further inaction, and reaffirmed Israel’s willingness prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. Such action would likely take the form of airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities, similar to those carried out against Iraq in 1981.
The efficacy of military action is far from assured. Iran’s nuclear sites are increasingly well protected and fortified. Fordo for example, is situated under a mountain and would be difficult to destroy with conventional weapons. Moreover, Iran’s air defence capabilities continue to improve. Following their provision of armed drones to Russia, Iran has according to US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, benefitted from “unprecedented defence cooperation, including on missiles and air defence.” Reports that Iran has asked Russia for S-400 SAM launchers have sparked concern in Jerusalem, with some questioning whether the window for successful military action may be closing.
The Biden administration meanwhile remains insistent that a diplomatic solution is the best way to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Although Iran’s support of Russia risks impeding any diplomatic efforts, the resumption of relations between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia could provide another opportunity for successful negotiations. The clock is ticking, however. Every day of American inaction raises the likelihood of Israeli action. Suffice to say, that action is unlikely to be diplomatic.
Image credit: US Department of State via Flickr

