The Dragon and the Porcupine: why an invasion of Taiwan is not so straightforward
By Will Holmes
Given the intractable nature of the Taiwan-China dispute, it is tempting to succumb to the conclusion that conflict over Taiwan is inevitable. Outright war, however, remains unlikely. Both sides are acutely aware of the disastrous costs of a full-scale war across the Taiwan Strait, and both sides are aware that the war would yield little, if any, strategic or economic benefit.
At the beginning of April, the Chinese military began a series of integrated military drills around Taiwan, including forces from all major branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These in effect amounted to and indeed were reported as a blockade of Taiwan.
Although the PLA has demonstrated their ability to successfully blockade the islands of Taiwan, an invasion and occupation would be considerably more challenging. It would require an immense operation integrating all the various branches of the PLA, a military which hasn’t seen major active duty since its invasion of Vietnam in 1979.
The PLA’s Navy (PLAN) may be the largest in the world, however it relies heavily on smaller classes of ships, such as frigates, corvettes and over 300 coastal patrol ships, none of which would be considered major surface combatants. Most analysts would not consider the PLAN to be a true blue water navy of the sort required for a major naval assault. For any invasion to be successful, the PLAN would need to secure the Taiwan Strait to maintain supply lines from the mainland to the islands.
Most analysts would not consider the PLAN to be a true blue water navy of the sort required for a major naval assault
The PLAN would also be responsible for ferrying troops across the strait. Given their shortfall in amphibious landing vehicles, the PLAN would have to rely on commercial ships to ferry troops and supplies across the notoriously perilous strait. These vessels would require a port in which to harbor, most of which will likely have been marked out and made redundant by Taiwanese forces in advance of any invasion.
Then there are the general logistical and technological challenges. The structure of the PLA, which largely resembles that of the Russian military, is untested. Many analysts have noted the Russian army’s organisational difficulties and lack of mobility. In particular, the failure to delegate tactical decision making to NCOs has hampered Russia’s forces. The PLA will hope that they do not suffer the same organisational burdens.
Taiwan meanwhile has adopted what’s become known as a ‘porcupine strategy’: trying to make any invasion and challenging and costly as possible, delaying the resistance’s collapse until external aid can arrive. To that end, they have invested in large inventories of anti-air and anti-ship missiles in the hope that these would be able to hold off any invasion force transiting the strait.
It should come as no surprise that, in the wake of such a violent contest, casualties would be immense. Civilians, trapped between Formosa’s western coast and the mountains to the east, would be trapped. The island’s infrastructure would be crippled, and the economy paralysed. Industries like Taiwan’s strategically important semiconductor manufacturing facilities would likely be destroyed.
In addition to all these challenges, China would also have to manage the diplomatic and economic blowback of an invasion. Western nations would likely be joined in opposition by South East Asian nations who, though happy to accept economic and cultural ties with China, are fiercely resistant to encroachments on their sovereignty.
Western nations would likely be joined in opposition by South East Asian nations who… are fiercely resistant to encroachments on their sovereignty
Given the high costs of an invasion, the low strategic benefits, and the immense difficulty of occupying Taiwan, it is unlikely that China’s historically pragmatic leadership would choose this course of action. Not willingly at least. There remains the possibility that the CCP’s leadership are pressured into acting, whether it be by a rogue military general or by the nationalist sentiment they have stoked in the Chinese public for the past decade.
A more likely strategy from the CCP is to operate within what scholars and analysts have labelled ‘the grey zone.’ This describes the space between peace and war in which states compete, or actions short of war for which there is no obvious military response.
China is an expert practitioner in this field. Rather than launch an outright invasion across the strait, China could instead seek to annex one of the islands nearer their shores or enact a protracted blockade. From there they could slowly escalate the conflict, gradually eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty while at no point taking any action extreme enough to attract the united ire of the international community of the kind seen in Ukraine.
Strategic ambiguity has served the United States well for nearly five decades, but the current policy leaves a worrying amount of room for the CCP to exploit. External powers need to clearly and jointly delineate their responses to grey zone activity relating to Taiwan. If the Western alliance and South East Asia is serious about deterring China, then perhaps they should say that.
Image credit: Taiwanese Defence Military News Agency via Wikimedia Commons
