From the Atlantic to the Urals: European Security in 2023
By Will Holmes
2022 has been a difficult year for European security. Few journalists could have predicted today’s war in Ukraine. But it was not unforeseeable. US intelligence agencies were uncharacteristically indiscreet in raising the alarm about the military build-up on Ukraine’s borders as early as the 3rd December 2021. An eight-man OSINT team working for Dow Chemical even predicted the date of the invasion as early as November 2021.
No one, however, could have predicted strength of Ukrainian resolve. The war has been a resounding strategic success thus far. Ukraine not only repelled Russia’s initial push to Kiev, but it has also managed to regain territory in the east and south, where the local population is somewhat more sympathetic to Russia’s territorial claims.
More widely, the evidence of the West’s strategic advantage is apparent. The Russian military has expended a significant proportion of its armaments, lost scores of vehicles and far too many of Russia’s young men. The ability of Mr Putin to exert hard power beyond his borders has been severely diminished.
Economic sanctions have exacted further costs on the Russian state, while Russia’s military embarrassment has handed the West an easy propaganda victory, exposed the deficiencies of Russian arms, and sent an important message to China vis-à -vis Taiwan.
Russia has gained an important land bridge to Crimea, but whatever strategic benefit this yields has been outweighed by the costs in gaining it. Notwithstanding the natural protection provided by the Dnipro River, Russian positions in southern Ukraine are still exposed to attack.
Ukraine is now pushing for the return to the borders of 1991, and there are some in the West who seem willing to support them in retaking Crimea. The blue water port in Sevastopol that many western strategists spotlighted now seems irrelevant given the Russian Navy’s display of obsolescence. Whatever the case, the Black Sea Fleet is still susceptible to a NATO choke hold in the Bosporus Strait.
All this has come at a devastating human cost. Millions of civilians have been displaced and thousands have died. European economies have just about managed to keep the lights on, but they are faltering. All the while the developing world faces a neglected risk of starvation as food and fertiliser prices skyrocket. However, the war progresses this year, the West will have a strategic victory. Ukraine, Russia’s youth, and the developing world will pay the price.
Ukraine is now pushing for the return to the borders of 1991, and there are some in the West who seem willing to support them in retaking Crimea.
Elsewhere in Europe, tensions are rising in the Balkans, as the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia deteriorates. It was hardly amicable to begin with. Serbia has refused to recognise Kosovo since the latter seceded in the bloody 1999 Kosovo War. More recently, majority ethnic-Serbian regions in northern Kosovo began blockading themselves from the Pristina authorities.
Last month Serbia asked NATO for permission to deploy their troops in northern Kosovo; this request was recently refused. In September of last year, Belgrade signed a treaty with Moscow to cooperate on foreign policy. A war in the Balkans would almost certainly distract Europe from Ukraine, while Serbia’s military preponderance relative to Kosovo would likely spare Moscow from having to redirect significant resources to their ally.
Further east, a trilateral ceasefire agreement between Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh looks precarious. Russia has deployed a small peacekeeping force to the region since 2020, but with Moscow preoccupied in Ukraine there are doubts that they can or will continue to stabilise the region. More generally, the risk of conflict on Russia’s periphery is worryingly high, with the local hegemon struggling to secure its sphere of influence.
Western Europe had a challenging 2022 but has for the most part remained unified. Concerns over Giorgia Meloni’s previously espoused sympathies for Vladimir Putin have largely dissipated, though her enmity towards the EU remains. France and Germany recently acceded to Ukrainian requests for armoured vehicles. Public debates over whether Europe should seek to secure a Ukrainian victory or a negotiated settlement have, for now at least, abated.
Private divisions remain, however. The coming year could see them rise to the surface once more, as the energy crisis continues to sting European economies. Germany’s Olaf Schulz is under pressure from domestic businesses to normalise energy flows, while Emmanuel Macron is likely to continue pursuing a European-centric defence strategy independent of American hawks in Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. Meanwhile, the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over disputed territory in the Mediterranean could fracture NATO’s eastern flank.
Europe fared better in 2022 than most would have predicted. Numerous threats remain, however, and Europe must be willing to bear the costs of its own security. With growing instability in the developing world, in the seas off China and on Russia’s periphery, Europe’s powers cannot afford to turn inwards. A united Europe endured the challenges of 2022. This feat will need to be replicated in 2023.
Image: Russian government via Wikimedia Commons

