Greenbacks, Redbacks and the fight over Black Gold  

By Will Holmes

The security in return for oil arrangement between the Gulf States and the USA has underpinned the global order for fifty years. That arrangement currently faces considerable challenges. On Friday 9th December, Xi Jinping announced that significant amounts of the oil trade could soon be settled in Yuan on the Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange.

Speculation over talks between Riyadh and Beijing relating to the settlement of oil deals in the Chinese currency has persisted since March. Xi’s latest announcement came after a summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the finale to his month-long diplomatic charm offensive. None of the Gulf Nations has affirmed President Xi’s statement, and in the near term at least, dollar-denominated trade will remain dominant. The summit and its announcements are significant, however, as they are an indication of three strategic trends that will influence global affairs for the rest of this decade.

In the near term at least, dollar-denominated trade will remain dominant

The first trend is the declining global power of the dollar. Since 1974, the vast majority of oil deals have been settled in US Dollars. This arrangement was formalised following a pact heralded by Henry Kissinger as “a milestone in [the United States’] relations with Saudi Arabia and with Arab countries in general”. The relationship that has subsequently evolved is one of mutual benefit. The Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, maintain the supply of oil to the US and, importantly, settle oil deals in dollars. In return, the US guarantees the security of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz and protects the Gulf monarchies from threats to their respective regimes.

The importance of the dollar-denominated oil trade cannot be understated. It has underpinned the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. This in turn has propped up the value of the dollar, allowing the US to maintain large spending deficits and buy aircraft carriers costing $13bn. The prevalence of the dollar throughout the global economy has further provided the US government with a powerful lever of economic influence. That influence is already waning due to sanctions and protectionist economic policies. The loss of the dollar’s oil-trading-hegemony will further diminish the US’s soft and real power.   

The loss of the dollar’s oil-trading-hegemony will further diminish the US’s soft and real power

The second strategic trend shaping the next decade is that of an expanding China, keen to upend the current international order. They appear to be doing so across multiple arenas. The Belt and Road Initiative provides the cornerstone of Beijing’s efforts to integrate with Middle Eastern economies. China became the largest foreign investor in the region in 2016, funding major port and infrastructure projects. Beijing has also signed 5G contracts with all the GCC nations. 

As the largest importer of Saudi oil, China realises the strategic importance of the region. Western fears of Chinese military expansion in the region were realised in November 2021, when US intelligence agencies discovered the construction of a Chinese military facility within the sprawling Emirati port of Khalifa. Similar concerns have been voiced regarding other deep-water ports in the region. 

The third trend of significance is the evolving hedging strategy of the Gulf States. The pomp with which Xi was welcomed to Saudi Arabia has led some to draw comparisons with Biden’s somewhat demure visit over the summer. The West’s overt criticism of Saudi Arabia (and more recently Qatar) has perturbed the Gulf States, as did the Obama administration’s reluctance to protect Gulf monarchies during the Arab Spring. More importantly, the US pivot to Asia and President Biden’s attempts to reignite the JCPOA have cast doubt over the current security arrangement. 

Unfortunately for the Gulf States, there remains no security alternative to the US in the region. There are a total of 24 American military installations in the region, the majority of which are situated along the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. These bases protect the flow of 17 million barrels of oil per day travelling through the Strait of Hormuz. China cannot currently compete with this military infrastructure. Though the PLA Navy is large, it is not yet capable of deploying multiple blue water fleets. Nor can the PLA supply the Gulf States with the arms sales that have been so lucrative for western defence firms.  

Unfortunately for the Gulf States, there remains no security alternative to the US in the region

Beijing is also hampered by existing relations with Iran, who were openly critical of their ally’s trip to the Gulf. Other security options for the Gulf States, such as Europe’s EMASOH, are meagre in comparison to the US might. 

The Gulf Nations must therefore tread carefully, on the one hand recognising the realities of the present strategic picture while at the same time making their disquiet known to Washington. The West on the other hand must decide which is more important: a consistently moral foreign policy or strategic and economic security? 

Image: US Naval Forces Central Command/US Fifth Fleet via Wikimedia Commons