Coup in Niger: how did we get here?

By Will Holmes

In the early hours on the 31st March 2021, gunfire erupted in the streets of Niamey, the capital of Niger. Mohamed Bazoum was about to be inaugurated as the country’s president after winning an election held in December 2020. The inauguration was supposed to mark Niger’s first transition of power between two democratically elected governments. 

Although the transition was not peaceful, it did go ahead. After heavy fighting around the presidential palace, the coup plotters were eventually repelled and detained by the Presidential Guard under the command of Brigade General Abdourahamane Tchiani. 

Two years later, General Tchiani has initiated his own coup d’état. On the 26th of July, members of Tchiani’s Presidential Guard unit detained President Bazoum at the presidential palace. Tchiani has since declared himself as the president of the ‘National Council for the Safeguard for the Homeland.’

The actions of Tchiani’s junta have further destabilised an already volatile region. Since 2011 the Sahel has been beset by a Jihadist insurgency, with attacks concentrated around the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Mali and Burkina Faso have both been subject to their own coups in May 2021 and September 2022 respectively. 

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Niger’s membership in the wake of the coup, and threatened military action if Bazoum was not reinstated and constitutional order returned. The original deadline for said action was the 7th of August.

The threat of force from ECOWAS has been opposed by regional and international powers. Mali and Burkina Faso both stated that they would treat any military attempt to restore Bazoum’s rule as a ‘declaration of war.’ Russia meanwhile has warned that ECOWAS intervention in Niger would lead to protracted confrontation. 

ECOWAS has emphasised its preference for a peaceful solution. Doubts remain regarding its resolve to take military action if it remains the only option. President Bola Tiinubu of Nigeria (by far the most powerful ECOWAS nation) has faced a strong domestic backlash against ECOWAS’ proposal. 

A lot will hinge on the response of France

A lot will hinge on the response of France, the other major power active in the region. France has approximately 1,500 troops stationed in Niger. Although France has strongly condemned the coup, it has not yet threatened direct intervention, instead throwing its support behind ECOWAS’ demands for Bazoum’s reinstatement. 

France has a deeply complex relationship with Niger and the region in general. Depending on who you ask, France has either tried to make up for their colonial crimes by supporting West African governments or has sought to exploit the region’s natural wealth at the expense of the local population, supporting corrupt and despotic regimes to that end.

France had already scaled back its presence in the region, withdrawing from Mali following the 2021 coup. France’s National Strategic Review, released last November, outlined the Macron government’s plan to scale back Operation Barkhane, their long running counterinsurgency operation in the region. French troops would no longer act independently of local forces and would instead act in a supporting role. The crisis in Niger has called even this limited engagement into question. 

In recent weeks the streets of Niamey have been bustling with protestors chanting anti-French slogans. French flags have been set alight in the street and protestors have attacked the French embassy. President Macron has warned that any attack against French personnel will not be tolerated.

The general anti-French sentiment is understandable given Niger’s colonial past and the perception of French meddling in the decades since. However, the intensity of anti-French sentiment and the speed at which it has spread have garnered concern among western governments that larger forces may be at play. Such suspicions are easily understood given the presence of Russian flags at protests. 

The general anti-French sentiment is understandable given Niger’s colonial past

Russia, and in particular the Wagner Group has been active in the region for some time, countering French interests and operations. The mercenary group has been present in Mali since French forces were expelled in 2021. Further south, the Central African Republic has ceded control of highly profitable natural resource industries to Wagner, with a senior US Intelligence Official labelling the country as a “proxy state” of Wagner. 

There is little evidence to suggest that Russia was behind the coup. Indeed, reports that President Bazoum was planning to dismiss General Tchiani from his post suggest there may be more personal motives. 

However, the sudden pervasiveness of anti-French (and pro-Russian) opinions on social media indicates the potential use of (dis)information campaigns, whereby partisan content is amplified on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok. Such campaigns are a known method of the Wagner Group: late last year the US State Department released a bulletin outlining Wagner’s utilisation of Pan-African voices to promote greater Russian involvement in the Sahel.

Russia’s interests in the region are two-fold. The first is the wealth of natural resources. Niger supplies a fifth of the EU’s uranium and accounts for about 5% of global supply. Mali meanwhile has some of the largest gold deposits on the continent. The Wagner Group has allegedly assumed control of three Malian gold mines in return for their services to the military regime. Russia’s other aim is familiar: to undermine the Western led (in this case French-led) international order.

Nonetheless, it would be foolish to dismiss the opinions of ordinary Nigerians. There are of course legitimate grievances against President Bazoum’s government and his ties to Paris. Any external power or group wishing to reverse the coup will need to be mindful of the civilian support for the junta, whether it be a majority view or not. 

It appears unlikely that France will take unilateral action to reinstate Bazoum’s government: it has not scaled back Operation Barkhane only to be embroiled in another ‘forever war’. Nonetheless France has long valued its ties to West Africa and will be reluctant to see said ties severed.

For now, all eyes are on ECOWAS, the only player with both the (albeit contested) legitimacy and the capability to restore democratic rule in Niger. But ECOWAS are understandably reluctant to start a regional conflict that would no doubt extend to Mali and Burkina Faso, both of whom see the removal of Niger’s junta as a threat to their own. 

The most recent reporting from an emergency ECOWAS summit has suggested that diplomats may seek EU funding for any ECOWAS operation. This would no doubt ease the financial burden on ECOWAS; however, it would also lend credence to allegations that ECOWAS is merely a puppet of French and European interests. 

But if Niger’s junta is allowed to retain its ill-gotten position, ECOWAS and the international community will have set a precedent that coups go unpunished. Three coups in three years is, to say the least, not a good look. Other governments in the region are understandably fearful that ambitious military commanders at home could be motivated by the success of their counterparts abroad.

The chances of a diplomatic or peaceful solution appear increasingly slim. That the actions of a small cadre of military officials could so easily put the democratic world in such a bind shows the immense difficulty of statecraft in a multipolar world.

Image credit: Zayid Ballesteros / Steven Donaldson via Wikimedia Commons