Reflections on the Special Relationship
By Callum Tilley
The UK government has signalled that it is no longer actively pursuing a trade agreement with the United States, abandoning its previous stance that a US-UK deal was a diplomatic priority following Brexit. The talks were initially halted due to the pandemic and concerns about certain American agricultural products meeting UK market standards (such as the well-known chlorinated chicken debacle). However, hopes for revived trade negotiations emerged after the Windsor Framework helped ease tensions between Washington and Whitehall.
The government maintains that the UK’s current trade relationship with the US, valued at approximately £279 billion, is already significant, and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would not necessarily bring much additional economic value. Nevertheless, the UK government currently forms agreements with individual US states, which are less lucrative than a formal congressional trade agreement.
While the government is capable of establishing bilateral trade agreements – two new FTAs with Australia and New Zealand respectively take effect soon – the promise of a US trade deal played a fundamental role in the Brexit campaign. The prospect of renewing the “special relationship” and achieving transatlantic economic prosperity outside the EU was touted as a reason to leave the bloc. With the collapse of the trade deal, it begs the question of whether yet another Brexit promise is going up in smoke.
The promise of a US trade deal played a fundamental role in the Brexit campaign.
Much like the promises for the additional £350 million per week for the NHS instead of Brussels, the lack of changes to the Northern Irish border, and continued participation in EU research schemes, the post-Brexit political landscape has witnessed many unfulfilled pledges made by the Vote Leave campaign. The failure to secure a trade deal with the United States is another example of a promise that was made and then broken, leaving Britons feeling disillusioned after voting for an idea that was never delivered. This is reflected in recent polls, with a YouGov survey indicating that 62% of respondents consider Brexit more of a failure than a success, while only 9% believe it has been successful. Clearly, broken promises, including the failed US trade deal, have contributed to this increasingly jaded view of Brexit.
This situation also raises doubts about the nature of the “special relationship” itself. What makes the current situation so special? The UK government doesn’t have a deal with the US (despite securing agreements with other countries), and if anything, Brexit has frayed relations between the two nations. The White House’s disapproval of the chaos caused by Brexit in Northern Ireland has been evident, and it is only now, with the Windsor Framework drawn up, that both Congress and the Administration are content to return to a more normal and less strained relationship. Indeed, Rep. Brendan Boyle (D – PA) told the FT that the Windsor Framework removed the “major irritant” in the two countries’ relationship.
This itself says much about our ‘special relationship’ – is the US’ friendship and goodwill contingent on the UK government enacting policy that is acceptable to them? If our “special relationship” depends on pleasing the US, can it truly be considered a healthy one?
Returning to the failure to secure a trade deal, it also reflects a decline in US-UK relations. It is evident that we are no longer a preferred partner in foreign policy when it is less beneficial for America. A relationship that lacks mutual benefits ceases to be a genuine relationship. This reflects the UK’s decline on the world stage more generally; after leaving the EU, we have reduced diplomatic influence on the Bloc, and the US perceive this to be a weakness.
This reflects the UK’s decline on the world stage more generally; after leaving the EU, we have reduced diplomatic influence on the Bloc, and the US perceive this to be a weakness.
Perhaps, following our departure from the EU, we have become a less valuable diplomatic partner to the US, which suggests that the promised post-Brexit trade agreement was never likely to materialize.
However, this does not mean that our relationship with the US is completely severed. AUKUS is a recent example of Washington prioritizing relations with the UK (as well as Australia), even to the detriment of the Franco-British relationship. It is noteworthy that we damaged our ties with our geographically closest ally to strengthen ties with the US. We still have strong connections with America through numerous international organizations like the UN and NATO, and our shared history is too robust to be completely overshadowed by the fallout from Brexit. Nonetheless, it does represent a decline in the British-American bond compared to the past. Whatever the reasons may be, the failure to secure a British-American trade deal marks a deterioration in the special relationship and yet another broken Brexit promise, resulting from both the realpolitik of transatlantic diplomacy and the Eurosceptic campaign’s inability to deliver on its pledges to the British people.
Image: U.S. Secretary of Defense via Wikimedia Commons
