What does Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive mean for China’s military power?
By Avesta Afshari-Mehr
General Zhang Youxia, one of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) most senior figures, is under investigation – reigniting debate about the scale and purpose of China’s latest anti-corruption drive. Alongside the investigation of Liu Zhenli, another member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the move leaves only two active figures on China’s top military body: President Xi Jinping himself and Zhang Shengmin, the PLA’s disciplinary chief. For outside observers, such developments raise serious questions not only about internal Communist Party politics, but rather also about the implications for China’s military ambitions, including its long-term approach to Taiwan.
Since Jinping became party leader in 2012, he has repeatedly framed corruption as an existential threat to the Communist Party’s legitimacy and governing capacity. Within the military, corruption has long been linked to issues like internal nepotism; procurement contracts; the sale of influence. Periodic purges, often justified as efforts to restore discipline and loyalty, have thus been a recurring feature of civil-military relations. What distinguishes the current round is its scale and its reach into the very top of the PLA’s command structure.
The PLA occupies a unique position in China’s political system: it is not a ‘national army’ in the Western sense, but rather the armed wing of the Communist Party. Ensuring its absolute loyalty to the party is a core priority made explicit by official commentary. State media has stressed that the alleged offences of Zhang and Liu go beyond personal corruption and amount to undermining the “CMC chairman responsibility system”, a phrase that not only signals a political challenge, but also a legal one.
The case of Zhang Youxia is particularly striking. Long regarded as untouchable, he shared deep personal and revolutionary ties with President Jinping, rooted in their fathers’ roles during the civil war. He was also one of the few senior PLA officers with actual combat experience, having fought in the late-1970s conflict with Vietnam. His background, combined with his former role overseeing weapons procurement, made him both influential and vulnerable. His fall underlines a central message of the current campaign: no rank or relationship offers immunity.
Speculation outside China has been intense, ranging from rumors of ‘coup plotting’ to allegations of espionage. Such claims are impossible to verify and sit uneasily with the opaque nature of Chinese elite politics, where leaks are rare and dangerous
Speculation outside China has been intense, ranging from rumors of ‘coup plotting’ to allegations of espionage. Such claims are impossible to verify and sit uneasily with the opaque nature of Chinese elite politics, where leaks are rare and dangerous. What can be assessed more confidently is the pattern emerging from official statements. The emphasis is not only on clean governance, but on political obedience and unity. In that sense, the purge reflects President Jinping’s conviction that discipline is the foundation of military strength.
Yet there are potential costs. Removing the most senior figures in nearly every branch of the armed forces inevitably disrupts institutional memory and command continuity. In a recent Communist Party Central Committee meeting, a striking proportion of uniformed members appointed just three years earlier were absent or disgraced.
This matters most in the context of Taiwan, often cited by both the CCP and the West as the PLA’s most complex and demanding potential mission. While Beijing has not confirmed any concrete timetable for military action, Jinping has set clear modernization targets: a high-tech force by 2027, a fully modernised military by 2035 and a “world-class” force by mid-century. The States also believe that China would sufficiently gain the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, but China has not responded to this speculation. Nevertheless, the hollowing out of experienced leadership could inevitably delay progress towards readiness benchmarks, particularly those involving joint operations and real-time command under pressure.
Simultaneously, it would be misleading to assume that the purge weakens China’s military in any straightforward or permanent sense. Experience suggests that younger officers promoted in the wake of purges are often more professionally trained, more technologically adept and more ideologically aligned with President Jinping’s priorities. Over time, this could produce a more centralised command structure that is leaner and more responsive to political direction – attributes the party leadership values highly.
Over time, [the purge] could produce a more centralised command structure that is leaner and more responsive to political direction – attributes the party leadership values highly
For now, the picture is one of transition rather than crisis. Military drills around Taiwan continue, and the PLA’s day-to-day operations appear unaffected. Politically, developments in Taiwan itself and the policies of the United States may have a greater bearing on cross-strait dynamics than personnel changes in Beijing. Nonetheless, President Jinping’s sweeping clean-up of the armed forces suggests a central tension in his leadership: and the effort to maximise control and loyalty may temporarily come at the expense of experience and flexibility.
Seen from Beijing, the campaign is about strengthening the party and safeguarding long-term stability. Whether it reshapes China’s strategic trajectory will become clearer in time.
Image: Roman Kubanskiy via Wikimedia Commons

