Obama’s love of multilateral foreign policy
By David Wynne-Griffith

Every American President since the Second World War has been defined by a foreign policy doctrine. The Truman Doctrine realized the theory of containment and the provision of the Marshall Plan; the Clinton Doctrine attempted to aggrandize American hegemony through the expansion of ‘soft power’; the latest Bush Doctrine was defined by hard military power, ‘coalitions of the willing’ and, if all else failed, unilateral action geared towards preserving vital self-interests.
So, what exactly does the ‘Obama Doctrine’ entail? Ephemeral indecision and ambiguous cowardice? Or a new commitment to multilateral responsibility in an increasingly diversified and unstable international system?
The truth is that Obama hasn’t really created a new doctrine- he has simply repudiated an old one. Indeed, the hawkish power politics of Bush’s neoconservatives, from the widely irrational Donald Rumseveld to the power-grabbing Colin Powell, is truly for the Oval Office archives. The Bush doctrine believed that any type of employment of US military force, be it unilateral or multilateral, was permissible if America’s vital interests were in jeopardy, on the condition that there was a clear exit strategy in mind and that the US could use overwhelming force to achieve its goals, irrespective of the enemy. These principles could not be more different to the ones that Mr Obama currently embodies.
It should come as no surprise. During his campaign and in his international bestselling book ‘The Audacity of Hope’ released in 2006, Mr Obama outlined his vision for a US foreign policy not simply based on the broad fundamentals of multilateralism, but defined by them. With the exception of a direct attack on US home soil, it would be within America’s ‘vital’ interest to act within a multilateral context. This meant adhering to the UN Security Council, rather than circumventing it, it meant using diplomatic niceties rather than declarations of domination to convince neighboring administrations of the sanctity of the international community’s right to intervene, and most importantly, it meant that America must play by the rules as well as making them.
The virtue of such an approach was, according to Obama, that America could fundamentally gain from a rules-based international society. In abiding by the rules, logic dictated that others would be forced to follow suit. Multilateral interventions would also lighten America’s heavy burden during times of war, would permit the US military to improve its jus post bellum capabilities (so-called ‘nation building’), and would start to undercut the Anti-Americanism that had been engraved on the hearts and minds of the European mainland by the Iraq War.
Despite being heavily criticized for his reticence over the procurement of a ‘no fly-zone’ over Libya, it seems that Mr Obama has stayed true to his own principles. In his own words, America has gained an “international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of the Arab people, and a plea to help from the Libyan people themselves”. Moreover, the joint statement procured by Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy not only affirmed NATO commitment to removing Gaddafi but also affirmed the Allied commitment to working within international mandates. However, many currently clamor over the simplicity of the Libyan case: Benghazi had to be saved from Gaddafi’s cataclysmic aggression and the US had a vested interest in helping the Arab Spring to maintain a peaceful, steady, if revolutionary course to keep their material oil interests afloat.
But what happens when a more complex, less vital case appears over the clouded horizon. Will America turn a blind eye, as in Rwanda and Darfur? Columnists and politicians alike can only wonder, because what Mr Obama’s new doctrine is essentially based on is diplomatic responsibility. It promises to adopt the proper judicial process concretized by the dictates of international law. This causes controversy across the ideological spectrum- a fear of procrastination, ineffective decision-making and eventually blind cowardice will be the eventual result.
However, it may be that Obama has unearthed a new cognitive change in the American psyche that goes someway to creating a fully functioning multipolar system based on consensual and commonsensical decision-making. In Libya, Obama is challenging the hegemonic position that America has automatically assumed since 1945. The NATO-led Libyan intervention is fundamentally different to the ones that America led into Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. It is defined by an equality of right: America may lead militarily, but it is adamant that it is not in charge.
This de-escalation of US global leadership will haunt Republican dreams of a second American century but it may prove to be a necessary bitter pill, which Americans must swallow. The peaceful yet powerful arm-flexing of China and other regional powers like India and Brazil means that the US may soon have to accept the incoming azimuth of its hegemonic power.
What we are seeing is an unprecedented commitment by an American president to the sanctity of international law within the international system, which points to a preemptive recognition of America’s gradual waning from its own international preponderance. After all, in front of the law, positions of strength and weakness are meaningless: for the weak, the law provides protection, for the strong it introduces inhibition. Mr Obama is gradually acknowledging that, in the future, the America he leads may need all the protection it can get.
