Should the UK vote for AV?

Alex Parsons says YES:

In the last election, over two-thirds of MPs failed to get majorities, across the country this adds up to more than half of voters voting for candidates who didn’t win – given this it’s not a huge surprise people feel their votes don’t matter. While the ‘No’ campaign has tried to make the case that “under AV the loser can be the winner”, under FPTP we have a ‘Parliament of Losers’ that collectively captured under half of the available votes. David Cameron says he knows “in his gut” that AV is wrong, I think most people have a gut feeling that there is something dodgy when an MP ‘wins’ the right to represent everyone when they couldn’t even convince a majority to vote for them.

The Alternative Vote fixes this problem by requiring candidates to receive at least 50% of the votes still in play to win. Rather than marking one box with an X, voters can rank as many candidates as they like. If no one wins straight out by getting over 50%, the candidate with the least votes has their votes move to their next preferences and so on, until someone wins. Simple enough, right? Despite their insistence we’ll have to pay for horrible, expensive voting machines, AV can be counted by hand, and in fact that’s what they do in Australia and it works fine.

AV makes the process of working out how to vote simpler. Currently, if you’re a Labour voter in a Lib Dem/Conservative marginal, what do you do? Do you vote Labour to show the party has some support in the area (which, if enough people did, it might encourage better candidates and better party support), or do you vote Conservative to prevent the Lib Dem candidate you loathe from winning? FPTP creates the problem of tactical voting, which makes the process of deciding who to vote for stressful even if your mind is made up. AV removes this stress – just list your actual preferences and the election counters will take care of the rest. AV means an end to ‘Only X can win here’ leaflets and parties trying to discourage people from voting for other parties based on numbers rather than actual political issues. As AV is likely to require candidates to pick up voters from other parties to win, it discourages them from running destructive campaigns as they might alienate the voters they need to reach 50%.

While it’s been suggested that AV means the end of ‘one person, one vote’, this is absolutely not the case. You still only get one vote, all you’re doing is giving instructions to the election counters on what to do if your preferred candidate can’t win. A related complaint is that ‘second preferences will count as much as first preferences’ but this happens just as much under FPTP. If you’re a Conservative voter tactically voting Lib Dem to avoid a Labour MP, you are voting your second preference, yet it counts just as much as Lib Dem loyalist’s vote. When put like this, it’s hard to see anything wrong with it – everyone is entitled to one vote regardless of how strongly they feel about it.

AV does more to help curb extremism; by giving voters the option of more preferences, it encourages voters of extremist parties to engage with mainstream parties, and by requiring candidates to get 50% of the vote, it requires those parties to engage back.

A classic defence of FPTP is that, whatever its faults, it provides us with strong one-party governments but, at this point, no parliament based on the Westminster model has managed to avoid having a hung parliament. Moreover, in Canada they’re having their fourth election in five years – FPTP is no longer a guarantor of strong governments.  Minority and coalition governments will be far more common in this century than the last and this is true under FPTP and AV. Given that we’re going to have coalition governments regardless, the question is ‘which system will make them more stable?’ and I’d say the answer is AV because under FPTP coalition parties will find elections increasingly difficult to navigate.

If we think about the next election, a Lib Dem running against a Conservative incumbent would be in a difficult position: if they do well they could take the seat, but if they simply do alright, they could just split the vote and let the Labour candidate win, reducing the chances of their party staying in government. Short of an election where coalition candidates don’t run against each other (which would be fatal for independent party identity), FPTP puts candidates in a coalition in a position where more people voting for them could cost their party its place in government. Under AV, this is a complete non-issue – both candidates can run whatever kind of campaign they want, but ask supporters to give their second preference to the other party. Voters are, of course, free to decide that, actually, they’d quite like to give their second preference to someone else, but AV makes it easier for coalitions to survive elections, while giving voters the opportunity to decide against the coalition if they want. It allows for more secure governments in situations where FPTP would tear them apart.

AV makes the link between constituents and MPs stronger because it requires that more voters made some sort of choice to elect them. It makes voting simpler by removing tactical voting, it constructively curbs extremism and it helps secure stronger coalition governments. On May 5th, it’s the best choice.

Ettie Bailey-King says NO:

First Past the Post (FPTP) is a flawed system- capricious and confusing at the best of times – yet virtually every criticism that can be directed at FPTP is a problem inherent in democracy itself.

Both are imperfect attempts at representing the will of the people. Both struggle to balance the interests of minorities and majorities against one another. Both are broadly committed to electing leaders based on their manifesto commitments, and giving them the power to realise their intentions.

Yet some people’s views will always fall out of sight. It’s not unjust- it’s the functional definition of ‘democracy’. If my desire to live in a low-tax theocracy led by divinely-appointed Charlie Sheen is thwarted, that is not an ‘unfair’ outcome.

Rather, it is a reflection of our belief that in the modest task of steering an entire country through potential crisis, we should make it difficult for any but the most deserving candidates to take hold of the wheel.

AV is not the panacea to freak results any more than it will prevent tactical voting: its idiosyncrasies and complexities are even more numerous, and FPTP at least has the advantage of being intuitively, strikingly simple.

Indeed ‘plurality’ rather than majority, whereby one only has to win the most votes, not necessarily more than 50%, may be the only realistic model for decision-making left to us- in a society which is increasingly diverse in its beliefs and life experiences.

To suggest that a vote is ‘wasted’ if it fails to produce the winning party – as the official YES 2 AV campaign suggests- is profoundly problematic. Under this metric, absolutely every electoral system other than pure Proportional Representation is unjust. Instead, we should recognise that there will always be compromises, but that our MP – whatever their party – is bound by duty to serve our interests. And if that MP was elected under FPTP, they will work within a parliament that is clearly, ideologically divided; with an authoritative government, and considerable transparency in its debates and decisions.

FPTP encourages governments with strong working majorities, for instance Blair’s 1997 landslide of 418 seats. These governments have the power to enact change quickly and set decisive strategic directions. They are bound firmly to manifesto commitments, and if they renege upon their promises the electorate can unambiguously judge their failures.

AV delivers governments for whom precisely nobody has voted. Not a small majority. Not a plurality. Nobody. When support is split unequally between several parties, the most popular party must vie for the support of much smaller parties to bolster their position.

They do not court robust parties capable of commanding high levels of support from the electorate; instead, power surges into the hands of fringe groups with fewer votes and less national appeal.

On the basis of existing polling data – though one cannot predict how things would change if people perceived a profound shift in electoral methodology- the UK would have had a considerable number of hung parliaments and coalitions under AV.

Instead of earning the freedom to concentrate, for the duration of each parliament, upon the issues in the UK and around the world which most require attention, our politicians would be reduced to constant playground politics, battling for power in a constantly-changeable parliament. Surreptitious deals and green-room negotiations are not democratic, nor open to public surveillance, yet they occupy a much larger role under AV.

Witness the Lib Dems’ trade-off between tuition fees and electoral reform: the former was a firm manifesto commitment which they were able to abandon despite mass dissent, and the latter is a last-ditch attempt at self-preservation from a party who fears they will never hold office again. It’s hardly ‘for the greater good’, and yet this is virtually the only rational behaviour one can expect under an electoral methodology which will severely weaken most parties.

Under AV we are less likely than ever to have a strident and outspoken opposition party as our future alternative. Instead, the parties blend imperceptibly together – unwilling to court controversy or voice suggestions which genuinely need voicing, for fear of alienating precious support from across the political spectrum.

The problem with treating all preferences as equal? Given the option of visiting Switzerland or Somalia, I would have a clear first and second preference. To say my wishes are of equal enthusiasm is disingenuous; just as the candidate whose 70% vote share derived from heaped-together low-preference votes is, at best, merely somebody who managed not totally to alienate the masses. The Irish call them ‘Transfer-Friendly’: is it so much to ask for the representative who was most ‘vote-friendly’ instead?

AV allows people who voted for the Monster Raving Loony Party, then the BNP, then UKIP, to have their political wishes most frequently integrated into the counting process – yet these are electors whose wishes correlate least with majority opinion. Their subsequent preferences tip the balance in each round of counting, while those people who are most properly called the ‘majority’ have one shot only.

FPTP is stronger for its flaws. It sets considerable barriers to gaining power, but it creates strong majority governments and allows for vociferous opposition.

Not everybody will cast a vote that produces their winning MP or government, but all can hope to be well-represented.

It is, in short, the lesser of two evils. As Noam Chomsky joked- “What’s wrong with the lesser evil? You get less evil”.