The DFID-FCO merger is questionable on two fronts
By Adam Leese
Boris Johnson’s announcement in parliament on the 16th June of plans to subsume the Department for International Aid (DfID) into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is questionable in both its motivation and its efficacy. The move, part of a long-trailed Whitehall shake-up, came amid a series of embarrassments for the government and appears to reflect, as argued by Sir Keir Starmer, the Labour party leader, “the tactics of pure distraction”.
Johnson’s announcement came in the wake of the government’s screeching U-turn on providing food vouchers throughout the summer to England’s poorest families following Marcus Rashford’s effective digital campaign, an ONS survey detailing 600,000 fewer people on the payroll, an economic contraction of 20% in April, and an ever-worsening death toll across all metrics. The questionable timing of the announcement was thrown into further relief when it emerged that Downing Street had failed to consult both the Commercial and Public Services Union nor the FDA, the trade union representing senior civil servants.
The Prime Minister’s statement appears to be a hasty scurry to take back control of the media narrative.
Moreover, the decision pre-empts the findings of the government’s Integrated Security, Defence, and Foreign Policy Review and contradicts the advice of the cross-party International Development Committee of the House of Commons. As such, the Prime Minister’s statement appears to be a hasty scurry to take back control of the media narrative by rushing forwards the shake-up and attempting to project an image of direction and control from behind the door of 10 Downing Street.
And that is to say nothing of the efficacy of the move.
Established following Tony Blair’s electoral victory in 1997, DfID has played an important role on the international stage, projecting British soft power across the world and fostering goodwill through working to eliminate global poverty, whilst also attempting to make positive steps to reshape Britain’s relationship with its former empire. The aid budget of DfID is the third largest in the world, and, under David Cameron, the UK became the only G7 nation to follow through on the stated commitment to ringfence 0.7% of GDP for international aid.
Making aid dependent on commercial interests is a dangerous trend.
In Johnson’s statement to the Commons, he said that “for too long, frankly, UK overseas aid has been treated like a giant cashpoint in the sky, that arrives without any reference to UK interests” and “we give as much aid to Zambia as we do to Ukraine…We give 10 times as much aid to Tanzania as we do to the six countries of the western Balkans”. This attitude has a concerning potential repercussion; a no-holds-barred capitulation of poverty-reducing development projects to the pursuit of the UK’s trading, commercial, and diplomatic goals.
Whilst protecting and furthering the security and diplomatic aims of the UK is undoubtably of great import, Johnson is swiping to the side the extreme poverty in which much of the respective populations of Zambia and Tanzania live. The expressed aim of foreign aid, as laid out in the 2002 International Development Act (IDA), is to work towards the eventual elimination of global poverty. Funnelling aid into Ukraine, a middle-income nation with a GDP per capita of triple that of Zimbabwe and Tanzania, would be an inefficient use of aid, particularly given the likely accession of Ukraine into the European Union in the next decade.
Indeed, the Prime Minister confirmed that channelling aid into Ukraine and the West Balkans is driven by a desire to protect “European security” and to challenge “Russian meddling”, rather than furthering sustainable development.
The negative reaction of senior politicians…suggests the existence of a cross-party consensus that will be able to closely scrutinise…the new FCDO.
In re-routing the UK aid budget to countries deemed to better reflect the UK’s national interests, Johnson risks falling into a dangerous precedent. Under the Thatcher government, the UK dispatched £238 million to Malaysia to support the construction of a hydro-electric power plant, the Pergau Dam, in return for an arms deal contract, which, come 1994, was declared unlawful by the high court. This instance of tied aid ought to serve as a useful reminder that, particularly in the context of post-Brexit trade talks, making aid dependent on commercial interests is a dangerous trend.
There are similar examples of mergers to take note of in Australia, Canada, and Norway. In all three cases the merger resulted in a brain drain, with senior figures exiting the civil service and taking their expertise in development with them, thereby significantly hindering the development efforts of the new department. In labelling DfID as a “giant cashpoint”, Johnson is certainly not endearing himself nor the new FCDO to these vital experts.
However, the negative reaction of senior politicians from across the political spectrum, including three former prime ministers, as well as NGOs and think tanks suggests the existence of a cross-party consensus that will be able to closely scrutinise the application of aid in the new FCDO. Moreover, the 2002 IDA enshrines in law the commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on aid, ensuring that the international aid budget is safeguarded.
Image: Antonio Acuña via Flickr.
