Cautious trend emerges in Cameron’s foreign policy

by Al Russell
The government’s decision, this month, to aid the French intervention in Mali by “providing logistical military assistance to help transport troops and equipment” marks an emerging trend in British foreign policy, seen previously in the “no boots on the ground” approach to Libya in 2011. It seems that the Cameron administration is hesitant to commit British troops to humanitarian intervention, but is equally wary of allegations of standing aside while human rights violations take place.
The primary cause of this move away from New Labour’s policy of liberal interventionism is the outcome of the two most prominent instances of this policy becoming reality: Iraq and Afghanistan, with the success story of Sierra Leon getting very little coverage. British soldiers continue to die in Afghanistan, while the public perception is that very little has been achieved in the twelve years since the US-led invasion; Iraq was similarly messy. These are wars of grey areas, with no clear victory or defeat, making their justification to the voting public very difficult.
The simplicity with which these campaigns are viewed is often frustrating. The fact that Iraq is no longer ruled by a dictator who ordered the deaths of tens of thousands of the population, or that Afghan women have gained the fundamental right to education since the Taliban have been out of power, are all too easily overlooked, and the government seems to have been acutely aware of this in its recent deployments.
On the other hand, Cameron’s foreign policy has clearly learnt something from disastrous episodes such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, when the international community simply watched as up to a million Tutsi Rwandans were slaughtered by their countrymen. It has been a source of embarrassment ever since, and is regularly held up as an example of the powerlessness of the United Nations.
Admittedly Mali presents a very different situation: the major concern seems not to be the violation of human rights, but rather the threat of the country turning into a “terrorist haven” which could destabilize the region and threaten Europe. The reality of a direct threat is questionable, but it certainly plays better with the electorate than interference.
In offering logistical support to the French operation in Mali, Britain is upholding its role as “a responsible member of the Security Council”, as described in the government statement on the operation, without putting the lives of British troops in serious danger. Nobody can say that the British government is neglecting Mali, and yet very little British blood or treasure is at risk.
The French involvement in the country has very different motivation. In recent years France has been strongly opposed to intervention, but their relationship with their former colonies is much more paternalistic and much less guilt-wracked than Britain’s, and thus the Islamist advance that threatens the government in Bamako is a very real concern at the Élysée Palace. Equally, Hollande’s ailing poll scores could only benefit from a successful intervention and strong, decisive action may help to combat his increasingly weak image in domestic politics.
Meanwhile, the result of Britain’s trade off is rather unsatisfactory. It seems that Cameronian foreign policy is an exercise in back-covering, neither risking British lives nor taking an explicit stand against intervention. On a fundamental level, the foreign policy of a state such as this one should be based around a commitment to doing the right thing, rather than an uninspiring exercise in sitting on the fence, more concerned with re-election than principles.
