Why funding bodies should pay us to write about Chaucer
The crucial flashpoint in the current higher education debate has been academic resistance, especially from the arts and humanities, to changes in the way research funding will be awarded. From 2013, in all subjects, 25% of funding for research will depend on a criterion called ‘impact’. Academics will have to prove, in advance, that their research is going to be of some kind of benefit to the wider community, more or less defined in cash terms. For scientists, this criterion will make ‘blue sky thinking’ hard to justify. But imagine if your area of expertise is Chaucer: you are unlikely to have any hope of winning that 25%, and you will certainly be expected to try. Even if it’s only 25% of any funding grant that’s at stake, you cannot do 75% of a project on Chaucer and 25% on applications of Chaucer to banking. So it seems the whole character of academic practice in the UK is under threat.
This planned new funding regime is part of the context for the lecture delivered in Durham recently by Prof. Rick Rylance, the Chief Executive of the AHRC (which distributes roughly a 100 million pounds a year for postgraduate research). His message was one of hard-headed economic austerity, arguing that arts and humanities academics will have to start proactively demonstrating their usefulness if they want to continue to receive government support.
Prof. Rylance is forced to walk the line between academic interests and government thinking, but his attitude is troubling. It is very easy to see that traditional academic evaluations of research are not related to economic values. They are delivered unto us by the history of our subjects, and their ultimate source is the pursuit of truth. The $64,000 question is to what degree the pursuit of truth should be supported by the state – yet to attempt to disguise academic research as a public service is a terrible compromise.
Part of the argument against the way things are going is that arts and humanities do have economic benefits, but that these benefits depend upon economic excellence as traditionally conceived. Rylance told us, for instance, that two billion pounds per year can be traced to foreign students who come to Britain to study – they come because British universities are among the best in the world.
What we need, above all, is perspective. There might or might not be some distant economic benefits in maintaining Chaucer experts, but we certainly cannot prove that there will be in any given case. The solution is to request that the government should indulge academic research for its own sake, but to accept a reduction in the level of that indulgence in the medium-term, so that indulgence as a principle will be sustainable through our budget troubles. Of course, where businesses or organisations are able and willing to act as patrons for ‘useful’ research, they will continue to do so.
Although I broadly disagreed with his approach, one aspect of Prof. Rylance’s message was pertinent. He ended his talk with a puzzle. Why is it that arts and humanities academics are so pessimistic? Why not be a bit more civic-minded and address political subjects more constructively?
The answer, I think, is a mistaken moral qualm about contributing to the analytical processes involved in making policy. If you survey the intellectual history of the last century, you will find brilliant socialists of many kinds, not to mentions a fair number of anarchists and fascists. Contemporary political coordinates are firmly liberal and capitalist, and it seems that today’s brilliant thinkers often prefer to wash their hands of the whole business. Meanwhile, policy makers in liberal democracies have to take extremely complex decisions, and the discourse on which their thinking rests is that of politicians, civil servants, ‘think tank’ researchers, journalists and propagandists for private interest. The individuals with the best chance of understanding the world are academics, but they play a subservient role.
To opt out of policy thinking is to leave the decisions to a class of people who have excelled in obtaining power and influence, but not necessarily in the pursuit of truth. It’s not clear that there’s any moral or humane basis for leaving national policy to such people. The really terrifying reality is not that they are a sinister capitalist conspiracy: it’s that they do not know what they are doing. Academia is the only institution with the intellectual resources to fill the vacuum. This role should not be tied to funding for research, but it should form part of the unwritten contract between academia and the nation, the basis on which funding is made available for pure curiosity.
This, ultimately, is the lesson of the spats between Mandelson and academia. It is possible to disentangle yourself from the public sphere, but the public sphere will not return the favour.
