This Is the End for the Super-Injunction – A Reply

By Conor Fegan

Mr Costello’s article begins with a bold assertion: people are finally beginning to agree with each other during radio talk shows (well, at least on one topic). Presenters will no longer need to moderate the public’s opinion through a volume slider when discussing super-injunctions, because Mr Costello says everyone agrees that super-injunctions have no place in the 21st century. Putting my lack of radio talk show knowledge aside, I want to take this opportunity to challenge Mr Costello’s self-consciously “bold” conclusion that the super-injunction is on its way out.

Mr Costello believes that it would have “insulted our intelligence” to define a super-injunction: if that is the case then I apologise, but the confusion in his article highlights the necessity of carefully defining this term. A super-injunction is a court order which prohibits both the publication of the information in question and, crucially, the publication of the existence of the injunction. The “super” element lies in fact that the existence of the injunction cannot be reported. This is in contrast to an ordinary — or anonymised — injunction, which only prohibits the publication of the information in question.

The reason why it is important to set this out is because Mr Costello mistakenly identifies the current celebrity threesome injunction as a super-injunction. Thankfully, it is actually an ordinary injunction: if it was a super-injunction Mr Costello, by discussing it, would be in breach of the super-injunction, in contempt of court. Thus, the article confusingly cites public disquiet over the current celebrity threesome injunction in support of an argument which asserts that the public suddenly dislike super-injunctions — an apparent non sequitur.

Celebrities who use “their considerable influence to keep the [sic] salacious private lives out of the public sphere because they fear it will damage their reputation.”

I say an apparent because perhaps I have unfairly simplified his argument: perhaps his argument is that super-injunctions are indefensible in light of the widespread hostility to the lesser, ordinary injunction currently in effect in the celebrity threesome case. This argument seems to be more in line with the article as a whole, which advances three principled arguments. However, with respect, none of these arguments are convincing.

Mr Costello’s first argument is that super-injunctions are abused by celebrities who use “their considerable influence to keep the [sic] salacious private lives out of the public sphere because they fear it will damage their reputation.” However, unless Mr Costello has a list of all the super-injunctions in force — which would again, likely be in contempt of court — he cannot say with any certainty that they are only used by celebrities: we simply cannot say with any degree of certainty who uses them and with what degree of frequency. Now, it might be retorted that I can’t point to a single case where a non-celebrity has used a super-injunction. However, that argument gets us nowhere: there is a perfectly logical reason why they presumably (but not definitely, because again they’re secret) have only been utilised by celebrities.

The ordinary citizen will rarely, if ever, need to resort to the admittedly drastic measure of a super-injunction, or even a lesser, ordinary injunction. In contrast with celebrities, the British public generally do not care about the sex lives of ordinary citizens: a Durham University student who partakes in a threesome is not likely to make national news.

But, if the situation did arise where an ordinary citizen found themselves in need of a super-injunction, they would be as entitled to use one as a celebrity would. In fact, in a very general sense, a private citizen will legally find it easier to obtain an injunction because they will generally have a greater expectation of privacy, and the press will find it difficult to prove a public interest in disclosing the sex life of an ordinary citizen: contrary to Mr Costello’s belief, a celebrity’s considerable public influence is, all other things being equal, more likely to influence the court not to grant them a super-injunction.

This then leads us to Mr Costello’s fallback position, that these injunctions are practically out of reach because they can only be accessed by the “super rich.” However, this argument does not strike a unique, knockout blow to the super-injunction: it applies equally to many areas of private law, from defamation to family law disputes. Therefore, it merely highlights the wider need to reconsider the accessibility of our legal system.

The final aspect of Mr Costello’s first argument is that celebrities use super-injunctions to protect their public reputations, assuming that their reputations are fundamental to their status as celebrities. However, the reason why celebrities use super-injunctions is not to protect their reputation, but to protect their privacy: a value which Mr Costello’s article has little regard for (it is mentioned once in his article, in passing).

The reason why celebrities use super-injunctions is not to protect their reputation, but to protect their privacy

Injunctions are granted where the press seek to unjustifiably interfere with a person’s expectation of privacy through the publication of private information. In the case of celebrities, their sphere of privacy is generally more limited than that enjoyed by the ordinary citizen: this limited sphere means celebrities will find it almost impossible to escape everyday media attention while, for example, they walk to the shop for milk.

While an ordinary citizen might well expect privacy in the same situation, a celebrity cannot because they will have courted general media attention by virtue of their status as a celebrity. While it is sensible to recognise that celebrities reasonably expect less privacy in their everyday lives, it is not however sensible to expect them to have no privacy rights. In particular, it is not sensible to strip celebrities of privacy expectations in their intimate private and family lives unless — like Kim Kardashian for example — they court publicity within those spheres.

The reason for this is simple: celebrities do not gain their status through full and frank disclosure of their intimate private and family lives, and so it is entirely proper that they should retain privacy in these areas of their lives. To use Mr Costello’s example, Ryan Giggs did not gain public respect because of his sex life: he gained it because he played football. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for him to expect his sex life to remain private and to attain a super-injunction to that effect.

So, when we hear of injunctions we should recognise that in the vast majority of instances the individual is using the law to secure their reasonable expectation to privacy, which seems entirely proper, particularly in those intimate areas where injunctions are granted. Mr Costello, with respect, mis-characterises the use of injunctions as concerned with reputation, thereby ignoring the key interest which super-injunctions protect: privacy.

This then leads onto Mr Costello’s second argument: super-injunctions “strangle” freedom of expression in a manner which is “horrendously at odds with British freedoms.” However, Mr Costello’s failure to appreciate privacy rights also impacts upon the validity of this argument: of course freedom of expression is interfered with by super-injunctions, but it is interfered with only in so far as it is justified to protect an individual’s reasonable expectation to privacy. When deciding on whether to grant an injunction, courts carefully balance two competing rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): the individual’s right to privacy under Article 8, alongside freedom of expression under Article 10. Under domestic law, the courts are directed to give particular regard to freedom of expression when conducting this balancing exercise.

Therefore, it is incorrect to assume freedom of expression has no place in the law of super-injunctions: on the contrary, it has a fundamentally important role, whereby super-injunctions must be demonstrated to be necessary and proportionate with regard to these rights. It is certainly fair to say that there are, at the very least, equally as many instances of the courts refusing injunctive relief on grounds that it would interfere with freedom of expression as there are examples of the courts granting relief in protection of privacy rights.

Further, it does not strike me as a particularly “British freedom” to permit the press to publish, without any restrictions, salacious material which is deeply invasive of an individual’s privacy rights. Freedom of the press is a proud British tradition, but I think Mr Costello goes too far in his defence of it, to the extent that he defends a distinctly un-British conception of it.

It does not strike me as a particularly “British freedom” to permit the press to publish, without any restrictions, salacious material which is deeply invasive of an individual’s privacy rights.

This then leads us onto the final argument: “everybody knows” who the individuals involved in the current celebrity threesome injunction are, thereby demonstrating that super-injunctions are futile. The minor flaw in this argument is that everyone does not know: a YouGov survey conducted on 18th April found that around 3-in-4 people did not know of the information. Even if a sizeable proportion of the population are aware of the information, the injunction has nevertheless limited the reach and impact of the story. Surely Mr Costello would agree that, in the absence of the injunction, many more people would know of the identity of the individuals and the details of the sexual encounter? If he does, then he must accept that the injunction was not futile but merely of limited utility. At most, his argument calls for the reconsideration of injunctive relief in light modern technology, not the complete abolition of such relief.

However, the more fundamental flaw is this: Mr Costello uses widespread knowledge of an injunction as an example of how super-injunctions are futile. It should not be surprising that a sizeable proportion of the population are aware of the information which is subject to the current injunction because the media have whipped up a frenzy and encouraged people to access the information. This might well reflect the futility of injunctions but it does not reflect the futility of super-injunctions.

If the current celebrity threesome injunction was a super-injunction, Mr Costello nor I could be discussing it as we are; the Daily Mail would not have had a front page spread on the matter; and the media could not have whipped up the frenzy which has led a sizeable proportion of the population to become aware of the information. In all likelihood none of us would be aware of its existence, never mind the details behind the injunction.

Therefore, paradoxically, Mr Costello’s description of the futility of the celebrity threesome injunction lends support to the argument made by some media lawyers that greater use of super-injunctions is needed to avoid the situation where information subject to an injunction becomes public as a result of media frenzies.

This leads me to my overarching argument: injunctive relief is not at the end of the road as Mr Costello suggests. Instead, it continues to play an important, albeit imperfect, role in the vital task of protecting privacy. Directly contrary to Mr Costello’s conclusion, the current celebrity threesome injunction may signal the need to make greater use of super-injunctions.

Criticisms aside, Mr Costello’s piece provides a welcome springboard for the discussion of an issue which will continue to be debated on radio talk shows in the coming weeks. Unfortunately for him, the Supreme Court did not appear to have a copy of his article on Thursday morning while hearing argument in the celebrity threesome case: they did not lift the injunction as he hoped, but ordered that it remain in place while they consider their judgment. While this judgment is unlikely to accept, verbatim, Mr Costello’s arguments or his conclusion — or mine for that matter — it will undoubtedly grapple with many of the issues we have raised in these two articles: the scope of privacy law, the effectiveness of injunctions in the modern day, and perhaps even the role of the super-injunction.

 

Photograph by Sara Simmons Photography via Flickr