The other Russian conflict

By James Meakin

On the 2nd of January in Zhanaozen, the second-largest city in Kazakhstan’s oil-producing Mangystau region, protestors poured onto the streets. Elsewhere, oil workers went on strike. They all demanded that the government slash LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) prices from 120 tenge (roughly £0.21 per litre) to 60 tenge.

What began as a demonstration against high energy prices in western Kazakhstan morphed into a call for the end of authoritarian rule by protestors in eastern regions. Demonstrators in Almaty successfully overpowered riot police and stormed the City Hall on the 5th of January.

In response to the scenes in Almaty, Kazakh President Kassym Jomart-Tokayev imposed a curfew, dismissed the government, and asked for peacekeepers from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)—a military alliance comprised of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. CSTO agreed to send around 2,500 peacekeepers under authorisation from the founding document on the basis that Kazakhstan was faced with “outside aggression.” Russian Airborne Forces comprised the vast majority of the CSTO deployment.

Why do these events in Kazakhstan matter to the Kremlin? Why were they so willing to send around 2,000 troops to Kazakhstan when, only last year, they refused a request from Armenia during skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh?

It would be prudent for the Russians to bolster security at such critical infrastructure

Firstly, Russia’s space programme is based in Kazakhstan at Baikonur Cosmodrome. In light of the unrest in Kazakhstan, it would be prudent for the Russians to bolster security at such critical infrastructure.

More significantly, the protests in Kazakhstan could be a window into the future for Vladimir Putin.  Nursultan Nazarbayev served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR from 1984 and became the nation’s first post-independence President in 1991. His authoritarian rule continued until 2019 when Nazarbayev resigned as President and passed the role onto the current holder, Tokayev.

From 2019, Nazarbayev assumed the position of Chairman of the Security Council. Amid these protests, Tokayev removed Nazarbayev from this post. At the time of writing this article, there have neither been any photos of Nazarbayev nor any concrete evidence as to his whereabouts since meeting with Vladimir Putin on 28th December 2021 in Saint Petersburg.

The absence of the ‘father of the nation’ in Kazakhstan’s time of greatest upheaval since independence is peculiar. That Nazarbayev appears to have been removed from his post is strongly suggestive of a political fall from grace. Tokayev may have used the political unrest to remove a potential alternative power base.

The central Asian neighbourhood has seen considerable challenges to authority recently—Belarus and Khabarovsk in 2020 and across Russia in early 2021. A show of force from Russian troops in Kazakhstan would send a message to the few remaining domestic opponents of the Kremlin not to consider taking to the streets again.

Absence of the ‘father of the nation’

What can the West do about Russian influence in Kazakhstan? On the 13th of January, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) declared that peacekeepers would begin their “gradual” withdrawal from Kazakhstan. The corollary is that Tokayev and CSTO believe the security situation in the country is sufficiently stable.

Despite this withdrawal, the protests and the CSTO response to them may be a useful opportunity for Russia to increase its foothold in Kazakhstan in relation to the West and China. Subsequently, Tokayev may need to show gratitude to Putin for helping to shore up his political power.

There is little the West can do in Kazakhstan. The fruit for Russia to increase its influence over Kazakhstan are not low hanging—they are on the ground. The West, therefore, must focus on where it can make a difference.

Image: Esetok via Wikimedia Commons