Sometimes the Art of the Deal is No Deal
By James Meakin
On the 28th February, the Hanoi Summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Leader Kim Jong-Un broke up without an agreement.
In his post-Summit Press Conference, President Trump said that he could not accept North Korea’s offer. He stated that the North Koreans offered to close the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex in return for the lifting of all UN sanctions on North Korea. In his view, this was too much of a concession.
Alternatively, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-Ho claimed that North Korea did promise to close the Yongbyon Complex but only in return for the lifting of some sanctions on his country.
Who was right? Why did we get here? Was Trump right to walk away from the DPRK’s offer? Will this chasm in understanding blight nuclear talks in the future?
Firstly, we do not know what actually went on in the talks between the Americans and the North Koreans. However, the North Koreans definitely want sanctions to be removed to facilitate inter-Korean projects such as a railway linking Pyongyang and Seoul. They have savvy negotiators who have an excellent grasp of detail and they will try their best to coax Trump into lifting more sanctions than they intended. If the North Korean negotiators were incapable of the aforementioned task, it is likely that Kim Jong-Un would deploy anti-aircraft guns against them. If that is not an incentive to scheme and trick the Americans, I really do not know what is.
Chemistry can get you close to where you want but working out the details can get you even closer
The reason many commentators give for the failure to strike a deal is the lack of working-level talks between the United States and the North Koreans. This is because Trump sees himself as a great negotiator who will, by himself, be able to persuade Kim Jong-Un to give up his nuclear weapons. He should bin this strategy and give the US Special Representative on North Korea, Stephen Biegun, much more of a free hand. The more substantive and detailed talks Biegun has with his North Korean counterparts, the higher the chance that Trump can strike a deal with Kim whenever the next summit occurs. Chemistry can get you close to where you want but working out the details can get you even closer.
To examine whether Trump was correct to reject the North Korean deal, we must consider the DPRK’s offer. Although the extent of sanctions relief the North Koreans wanted is nebulous, what were the United States going to achieve by closing the Yongbyon Complex? What is it? What use is it to the North Koreans? Former DPRK Deputy Ambassador to the United Kingdom and prominent defector, Thae Yong-Ho, thinks the Yongbyon offer is a trap. According to Thae, Yongbyon is primarily used for making Plutonium nuclear warheads. Currently, the North Koreans use Uranium in their warheads. The closing of Yongbyon does nothing to reduce the nuclear threat from North Korea meaning that Trump was absolutely right not to fall into the trap – regardless of how much sanctions relief the North Koreans would get.

The evidence from the North Korean press is thankfully positive. The (only) official North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun commented on the Hanoi Summit. They said that it was of “great significance in building mutual trust.” By contrast, when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang in July 2018, he was accused of making “gangster-like demands” of the North Koreans. The North Korean press could be playing Trump and trying to coax him into giving lots of concessions. Nonetheless, at least they did not call him a “dotard.”
Overall, Trump was criticised at the end of the Singapore Summit back in June for giving too much to the North Koreans whilst getting too little in return. I think this analysis is prescient. Trump has hopefully learnt his lesson from Singapore and realised that “no deal is better than a bad deal.” The North Koreans are not saying that there is no chance of more working-level talks, so hopefully progress can still be made.  The most important thing to remember about North Korean denuclearisation talks is that they are a process, not an event. I wish the American negotiating team the best of luck should there be any future talks. Their success will be the world’s success.
Image via Flickr by The White House.
