Someone else’s war: the issue of interventionism in Ethiopia
By Eli Rasmussen
In come the heavies. As Ethiopia wrestles with mass violence within its borders and the exacerbation of a largely man-made famine, global powers — the United States and China front and centre — are evaluating to what extent their involvement in the crisis should be.
Re- “elected” as Ethiopia’s ruling political party in a controversial 2015 election, the circumstances of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front have spiralled in the years since. In 2018, the TPLF was ousted from a government headed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and in 2020, after decisions to not hold regional elections on account of the coronavirus pandemic, the party and the northern state of Tigray announced their decision to not recognise the authority of the Ethiopian government.
With the help of Eritrea, a late enemy-turned-ally, Ethiopia has engaged in military action with the region and both sides have committed atrocities since the fighting began last November. An estimated two million civilians of the six million living in Tigray have fled their homes since Mr Abiy’s decision to invade, while others are caught in the crossfire, or are starving to death as Ethiopian troops block humanitarian aid from entering the region in what the United Nations calls the largest starvation emergency in the world right now.
The largest starvation emergency in the world right now
The international community, on the other hand, looks on with conflicting opinions, cautious not to further deteriorate relationships to the second most populated country in Africa. The United States has made several sets of threats about sanctions to all involved parties, most recently after new reports showed that Ethiopia used its national civil airline to move weapons to Eritrea. China has taken on a different attitude, almost scolding the U.S. for its haste to interventionism. “The U.S. should prudently handle relevant issues and play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the country”, remarked Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian.
It is difficult to interpret either of these positions as genuine. The U.S., which has arguably had a closer and longer relationship with Ethiopia than any other African nation, has not been consistent with its views on humanitarian matters. From 1991 until 2018, the TPLF ran an authoritarian government over the country; protests were squashed violently by police while corruption ran rampant, political opponents were imprisoned and national elections have been called out as blatantly fraudulent.
The U.S., however, ignored a large part of their ally’s domestic affairs, appreciative of Ethiopian military support against jihadists in neighbouring Somalia. The Chinese guise of thoughtful indifference surrounding the issue can be likewise disregarded. Already the country’s largest bilateral lender, China is fully aware of whom Ethiopian trade will favour if it continues down its path of growing isolationism to the West, especially if it regains its streak of commercial growth apparent before its civil war.
The power of sanctions (or even the threat of them) tend to be rooted more in their symbolic denunciation
Regardless, any noise outside of Eastern Africa seems to be too far away for Mr Abiy to hear. Upon reception of a warning from the UN’s humanitarian chief that tens of thousands are at risk of starvation in the country, the Ethiopian response was to remove seven of their senior officials from their land. One of the only places in Africa to remain uncolonised by European powers in centuries prior, Ethiopia’s resilience in the face of international pressure is a source of pride for its citizens and the prime minister’s attitude through this conflict is a definite reminder of that.
Still, a new age entails new circumstance. As much as Mr Abiy might like to implicate his current situation with a history of outsider exploitation, his country no longer holds the moral high ground, and his starvation crisis will not fix itself. The question is: are economic sanctions that fix? Similar events in the past show little evidence that they are, especially when not applied universally and even then, it is difficult to measure the impact of such legislation. From 1962, the UN applied round after round of sanctions against apartheid law in South Africa until their repeal in 1990, yet in this timespan, the South African economy experienced steady growth.
Moreover, to correlate directly these two happenings ignores a wide variety of other social and political factors, civil dissent most importantly. Indeed, the power of sanctions (or even the threat of them) tends to be rooted more in their symbolic denunciation, as a tool of international diplomacy and a means of maintaining national reputation. That is not to say, however, that they hold no power. After all, when all roads to an ethical emergency are blocked, sanctions may be the only viable recourse.
Image credit: World Economic Forum via Creative Commons.

