Nepal’s Gen Z Revolution: the nature of power in the age of social media

By Julia Davies

The symbolic image of last month’s protests in Kathmandu is that of Parliament ablaze from the inside, burning along with it traditions of corruption and exploitation by those in power. This image, however, remains surface level; it is representative not of a complete revolution, but of the double-edged political power of social media.

On the 4th of September, a social media ban struck Nepal: it affected 26 platforms including Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, on the premise that these companies failed to meet a government-set registration deadline. Four days later, a peaceful rally against these government bans began, and rapidly escalated into violence from both sides. The Parliament’s security forces fired first, killing and wounding protestors who were attempting to enter the Federal Parliament building.

Then Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli, claimed that the ban would enforce restrictions to prevent fake news and hate speech spreading online, but this initiative was met by many sceptics. Perhaps coincidentally, the timely ban interrupted rising criticism against Nepali ‘nepo-babies’ posting and flaunting the unattainable lifestyle of the ultra-wealthy. As a consequence, a spotlight was beginning to glare upon the habits of corruption in Nepal that ensure the rich get richer. The misuse of government funds, chronic tax avoidance, and bribery of the courts, are only a few examples of ways money was essentially being funnelled from the hands of workers into the pockets of the powerful. In such a political climate, the risk of mass impotence is high, and the internet is often a prolific vehicle of criticism against the state. As a result of trying to harness any form of political power, it is clear young people view social media as a kind of right: their right to free speech, information, and in a lot of ways a weapon against their own exploitation. In contrast to the concentration of power among the elite, social media is a democratising force.

Power is harder to conceal from a generation that habitually resides and sleuths on the internet

Indeed, the largely indiscriminatory access offered by social media is clear across the world: globally, 98% of people over the age of 16 have access to a mobile phone, and 93% of internet users spend time on social media. Nepal, in particular, has a significant Gen Z population, with the median age being 25.3, and in 2025, 72.8% of those over 18 were identified as social media users, which is disproportionately high in South-east Asia. In fact, Gen Z was written all over this protest. Its triggers are popular subjects of social media discourse: anxiety around media censorship and criticism of nepo-babies. The trend here suggests that young people feel threatened by showy displays of power; at the same time, power is harder to conceal from a generation that habitually resides and sleuths on the internet. For a generation strengthened by extensive networks of online communication, it appears that news spreads faster than fire. Not only: bad news is almost totalising.

However, these networks are often invisible. It is easy to forget the masses of silent onlookers on the internet, and the hidden presence of chat forums. So, when accounts from the day recall violence ‘materialising’ from a protest originally lead by slogans like ‘corruption is sus’, ‘stop ghosting democracy’, it seems the mobilising potential of a viral media onslaught was grossly underestimated. The protest speaks deeply to the dual nature of virality, whereby content escalates exponentially, and then dies an obsolete death. Similarly, the protest surged to the point where the Prime Minister resigned but has struggled to have a lasting positive effect in Nepal. Part of our interaction with social media is to be reactionary: this is not to say that the protest was superficial by any means, only that it happened too quickly for people to be able to forecast the consequences. Therefore, both the wild success and unfortunate failure of the protest was that it was so decentralised. Power was not concentrated in the hands of a few but in the hands of many, which is perhaps the political blueprint for a new democratic order. However, once the protest reached its apex, the people, and thus power dispersed, at that point spread too thin to construct a cohesive post-revolutionary order.

It takes something big to spark a revolution, which social media fuelled impressively, but turning that spark into something lasting requires something else entirely: new political foundations based on truly transformed relations of power. The government has been taken apart, but now the question remains as to whether a new one can be built, rather than just replaced. Does social media have the capability for positive, constructive change, or does algorithmic behaviour capitalise only off cycles of destruction?

On one side, social media deconstructs patterns of power, but if it is only used as a tool of criticism, then it won’t have helped but to replicate them. Perhaps, we need to be selective about what aspects of it we bring with us into the real world, so that it does not draw lines of fracture within society but instead brings people together

Image: Himal Subed via Wikimedia Commons