Why Italy’s problems go further than the manager
By Fabrizio Lovecchio
“If we did not qualify for the World Cup it would be a catastrophe”.
These words, pronounced back in October by Gian Piero Ventura, now sound like a daunting prophecy of the dramatic epilogue to his career as Italy manager. What has already been labelled as one of the most blatant failures in the history of Italian football – and sport in general – shocked the whole nation and profoundly unsettled the Italian Football Federation.
With Ventura having paid the price for his unquestionable tactical mistakes, however, the focus must turn to the root causes of Italy’s decline, deeply embedded in the fabric of Italian football and entangled with past choices and political considerations.
First of all, there are some common myths to be dispelled. As proven by recent statistics, the truth is that the number of foreign players in Serie A is not to blame for Italy’s breakdown. Last year’s data tell us that 53 percent of all players in Italy’s top league come from a country other than Italy, a seemingly considerable figure at first glance, but this is perfectly consistent with other top championships, with 49 percent in France, 58 percent in Germany and a 67 percent peak in the Premier League.
It is also misleading to claim that foreign youngsters prevent Italian youth from blossoming, seeing as only 43 percent of those born after 1996 with at least one game in Serie A have a different nationality, compared to 45 percent in Spain, 49 percent in England and 58 percent in Germany.
What is much more striking is the lack of Italian players performing in the major European leagues – only 20, a ridiculously small number compared to the 56 and 79 Spanish and French players respectively playing in the top five leagues.
Instead of trying to prove their worth abroad, Italian players seem to prefer to rot on the benches of Serie A, and so limiting the number of foreign players would be no solution. Sure, there is no scientific correlation between more nationals playing abroad and higher chances of success, but history tells us that national teams with more members playing abroad have traditionally been more successful (France in 1998, Brazil in 2002, Germany in 2014).
The most significant explanations for the debacle, however, are probably to be found in the long-established hostility among Italian clubs and the self-interested political dynamics inherent to recent Italian football.
First and foremost, previous national team managers repeatedly urged the Federation to organise stages throughout the year so that they could familiarise themselves with the players, strengthen team spirit and leave a ready-for-use tactical imprint. This proposition has always been vetoed by Italian clubs, who are primarily concerned with the health of their own players and terrified at the prospect of potentially ending up worse off than their rivals.
This tendency to refrain from cooperation is exacerbated by inner tensions between Italian clubs, marked by bitter rivalries which sometimes closely resemble hatred. In such a precarious and explosive framework, it is often impossible to find a compromise, with each team selfishly withholding players and encouraging supporters’ pressure on the national team manager by contesting his choices.
A commonly understated consequence stemming from these issues is Italy’s terrible performance in friendlies. Usually unable to call up top players or train enough to inject the desired tactics into the team, managers often use friendly matches to try out promising youth and improvised or unfamiliar tactics to resort to in times of need.
Some would argue this is the ultimate purpose of these games, but such matches help shape the FIFA ranking, which determines the opponents to be faced in international competitions, including qualifying groups. It has lately been pointed out how, had Italy not lost a friendly against Portugal back in June 2015, they would have been allocated to a different slot, thus avoiding the matchup against Spain in the group stage and the resulting playoffs.
These specific problems are also related to the broader deficiency of government and institutions in promoting sports in schools on a national level. Roughly 28 percent of Italian schools lack a gym, a requirement which is systematically met in other countries.
Even when a gym is available, structures and equipment are often severely damaged, resulting in physical education being regarded more as a break from lessons than a subject in its own right. The lack of resources is mirrored by Italy’s appalling overall results across all sports, ranging from an endless series of losses in rugby and athletics to a worrying decline in sports in which we used to stand out, such as water polo, volleyball and artistic gymnastics.
Is Italy then doomed to an endless spiral of decadence? Well, there is a notable instance which might provide inspiration and a starting point for a long-term reform of Italian football. In the aftermath of the disastrous Euro 2000, the German Football Federation understood the necessity to change, and launched a program which laid the foundations for their dominance in the last decade.
Scouting inefficiency, inadequate youth academies and mediocre training of future managers were identified as the main flaws of the German game, and were addressed through considerable investment and tight cooperation between clubs.
More importantly, German football turned to the second generation of immigrants born in Germany and granted German nationality by resort to the jus soli, involving players like Boateng, Khedira and Özil, who have since been permanent components of the starting lineup.
A solution to the crisis, therefore, seems possible, yet it requires both a radical institutional change aimed at promoting sport among teenagers through a lasting investment plan, and a common effort on the part of clubs and the Federation to foster a wiser and more cooperative attitude towards the national team.
Photograph: Nazionale Calcio via Flickr
