The Nigerien coup will not help its poverty-stricken people
It would not have taken much to miss the media coverage of Niger’s latest military coup d’état. It did not help that the former French colony failed to tick any boxes of originality, with its events unfolding in the classic style that has been witnessed time and again across post-colonial Africa.
Yet it seems that the real origins of this inattention lie with an ever increasing, and ever concerning neglect of African affairs. More than ever before, Africa is in danger of gradually sliding off the world map. Africa’s share of world output is ever declining due to the expansion of the newly industrialised East Asian countries. The end of the Cold War has given rise to a severe de-prioritisation of Africa, with world players no longer content to jostle for strategic ideological outposts on the continent.
Although the military junta has explicitly expressed its purpose of restoring ‘democracy and good governance’, the weight of history is truly stacked against them. Even if Niger does manage to defy the odds and successfully implement democracy through its transitional Supreme Council, the question of the military will undoubtedly cast a shadow over future proceedings, with fear of a future repetition likely to remain ingrained in the minds of any newly-elected politicians. Certainly none of them will be cutting the government defence expenditure or thinking about ending conscription any time soon.
The Nigerien case is, in many ways, mirrored across the continent, where the military has incessantly haunted post-colonial African governments since the first days of independence. Its extraordinary impact is demonstrated through a recent comparative study, which calculates the long-term political ramifications of the African military. Remarkably, statistics for the present-day levels of governance and stability of African states have been found to be directly and negatively correlated to the existence of a military on independence. Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Swaziland, and the Gambia, are all on average far better off today than countries such as Niger, Kenya, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In light of the persistently negative terminology of corruption, greed, and vice that is typically thrown around in the West to describe African regimes, there is a great risk of forgetting the true nature of African independence. Although the shackles of colonialism were finally broken in August 1960, Nigerien leaders were faced with an immeasurable and somewhat impossible task on independence. They inherited a minimalist colonial state to which any sustained democratic and inclusive political culture was completely alien. Their economies were completely reliant on the continued demand for a narrow range of export commodities. Their people lacked adequate education and healthcare. Their country lacked infrastructure and suffered from harsh climatic conditions. The list naturally goes on.
The vision of following in the footsteps of their former colonial masters pervaded Africa on independence, with Western schooled African leaders intent on implementing their own industrial revolution. Ambitious programmes of import substitution industrialisation were launched through a common African and Western consensus, but simply could not be supported by the underdeveloped state of African agriculture and the weak capabilities of the inherited state. Almost universal financial collapse after the world economic crises of the 1970s was, therefore, in many ways the logical end product of the fragile economic growth that greeted African decolonisation.
Although only those on the conspiratorial left would assign the blame to neo-colonialism, it is equally clear that the West could be doing a lot more to help the landlocked West African country. France, the former colonial landlord, continues to retain effective control over its rich uranium resources, as well providing the lion’s share of its military funding. The externalisation of economic management under the IMF has forced through a harsh programme of privatisation, state cutbacks, and trade liberalisation, which threaten the poorest in society. They also have the potential to aggravate humanitarian emergencies, such as the notoriously catastrophic famine of five years ago.
For the vast majority of African countries, sustained economic development continues to be a distant goal on the horizon. When all is said and done, the long-term impact of ploughing international aid into the continent will be marginal, and do little to push Niger along the path of political stability and sustainable development. After all, the effects of development aid are widely proven to be dependent on the governmental policy of the recipient.
What is really needed is all that Western government’s are currently unprepared to concede: multilateral debt cancellation, trade justice, and less external economic meddling. It is only through these changes that Niger and its African neighbours stand a realistic chance of breaking the vicious circle of political instability and economic decline that has plagued the continent since independence.
