The Arresting Complexity of the Syrian Civil War

By Toby Hambly

In an unusually clumsy way, Obama cornered his legitimacy between a rock and a hard place: during August last year, in what was apparently an off the cuff remark, he stated that evidence of the transport or use of chemical weapons would cross a ‘red-line’ that would change his ‘equation’ of the Syrian civil war.

Syrian Independence flag flies over a large gathering of protesters in Idlib.
Syrian Independence flag flies over a large gathering of protesters in Idlib.

A recent U.N. report has advised that there are ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that government forces have used chemical weapons in four attacks in March and April this year. Given the lack of any real response one can only assume that Obama didn’t intend to define any part of the war in such unaccommodating terms – he now prefers ‘game-changer’.

Obama is usually quite adept at exhibiting a certain legalistic nuance when defining his attitudes, carving out room in which to manoeuvre. Especially on issues of dubious international legality – or evident illegality perhaps – such as Guantanamo Bay and his drone programme, one can see his brilliant legal brain whirring around anything that may tie him down in the future. Syria’s civil war is too volatile, too rooted in history and too complicated for any foreign policy lacking such wisdom. It involves national, regional and international layers of conflict that are distinguishable but inseparable.

When it comes to judging any response from the international community – the EU’s decision to lift its arms embargo or the Russian deal for S-300 surface-to-air missiles – one must confront anew regional experiences and traditions of resentment that predate and are likely to outlast the Civil War. So salient are these cultures of conflict that the animating spirit of revolt in Syria is mired in a swamp of fractious division of purpose. This violently negative cohesion benefits Bashar al-Assad. He is proficient, as his father was, in the uncompromising art of surviving amidst chaos.

His strategy seems to be a shrewd commitment to accepting the status quo more quickly than others, while never accepting that the writing is on the wall. Assad knows that those who are willing to die in this war feel the ultimate and seismic importance of Syria. It is the result of a veritable earthquake of sectarian and political pressure decades old and its first tremors were in Iraq and Lebanon.

The Lebanese civil war lasted for fifteen years until 1990 and has since been kept in stable suspension, while its constitutive sectarianism is as marked as ever. In Iraq, the 2003 invasion brought the long excluded Shia majority to power with the Kurds ending almost a century of Sunni dominance. Shia preachers came out of the woodwork after decades of repression. Initially, this movement held steady in the face of reprisals from extremist Sunni groups, for which the credit lies with Grand Ayatollah Sistani – a reasonable, pragmatic and pacifistic man.

A 2008 RAND study found that in mid-2004, attacks were increasingly directed away from US and coalition forces. Although attacks on foreign troops persisted, this study makes it clear that those taking part increasingly saw the regional power balance between sects as the context in which they fought. The power vacuum caused by the removal of Saddam Hussein was the proximate cause for a war within Islam and between those who were willing to die for their allegiances – a war in which 12,284 civilians died.

Presdient's Square, Aleppo, displaying former president Hafez al-Assad.
President’s Square, Aleppo, displaying former president Hafez al-Assad.

Syrian civil war is a continuation of this dynamic. Syria is different from Iraq in that these regional and sectarian power struggles are taking place in a state that has not been formally invaded, still in the possession of some sovereignty. It is similar in that an excluded majority is fighting a long privileged minority while Western powers play a dislocated and insignificant role. Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Shia in Iran and Iraq believe that Assad’s Alawite regime is a sine qua non for Shia Islam.

Sunni states are keen for Assad’s departure to break the Shia axis that extends from Iran through Iraq to Syria. States across the region, especially those who border Syria, feel forced to acquire a finger in the pie. Weapons, fighters and money flow across the Jordanian border from Saudi Arabia, over the Lebanese border to the South West and from Iraq to the East. With Qatar, the CIA has sent seventy flights to Turkey with military aid for the opposition.

This war, which has claimed the lives of approximately 80,000 people to date, involves myriad nations, sects and institutions and it collates such a dizzying array of private, public, religious and political interests that it cannot be described in one way or according to one scheme. It has been described as part of the Arab Spring, in sectarian terms, in national political terms, and most loosely as a revival of the East/West Cold War dichotomy but its significance for those involved is indigenous and multifaceted.

This is what Assad knows more intimately than anyone. What his doughy, slack face belies is a talent for divide and rule and a knowledge that as long as this conflict is many things to many people, he will survive. His favourite fact seems to be that there are 23 foreign nationalities fighting in Syria. This is, in many ways, the guarantee for his survival as well as a way to play the victim in interviews. While it is correct that the use of chemical weapons seriously changes the character of this war, ultimatums and ‘red-lines’ only serve to divert more attention away from the original casualty – the animating spirit of revolt.

Assad has successfully amputated this revolutionary narrative and replaced it with chaos and fear. While Kerry, Hague and Fabius harden their faces and puff up their chests, innocent people will continue to die and the real horror of Assad’s police state will continue to be veiled behind the breakdown of Sykes-Picot. The colonially infused ossification of division enshrined in this treaty is crumbling, and now more than ever, Western governments must accept their uninterrupted distance from the political outcomes of Middle Eastern conflicts. Instead, they must focus on the real human cost of this war in neutral and unassuming terms.

Photographs by Freedom House and Krokodyl.