Human rights are crucial to our society and our morality
by Benedict Douglas
Under the pall of the inhumanity of the second world war the countries of the world came together within the United Nations organisation to recognise the existence of ‘fundamental human rights’ deriving from ‘…the dignity and worth of the human person….’ Human rights are thus a fundamental claim that there are certain acts which humans should not be subject to, or are only permissible in certain clearly justified circumstances, because of the mere fact that they are human.
The possession of these rights were not seen to depend on whether someone was a citizen of a particular state or fulfilled their responsibilities as such. They did not discriminate on the grounds of any particular religion, any particular skin tone, or any other status other than the requirement to be human. Crucially, in this way popular political talk of ‘rights and responsibilities’ is in danger of missing the fundamental point of rights. Human rights are not something that a human earns nor something that they can lose; they are possessed inherently. Thus talk of prisoners, terrorists or rioters losing their rights because of their actions goes against the very core of what it means to have a human right.
However, whilst rights are inalienable and cannot be lost they also cannot also all be absolute. Newspapers cannot have an absolute right to freedom of speech and individuals cannot have an absolute right to privacy. The two conflict. However in such a conflict victory for one does not mean the complete loss of the other. Instead we must consider what weight we give to the competing rights on the fact of a given case. Does the importance of an individual’s right to personal integrity and property possession necessitate and outweigh the right of a convinced criminal to participate in our society by voting? The fundamental debate within human rights is not who has and who loses rights, it is rather what weight to we give to the rights and which rights should outweigh others on the facts of each particular case.
Determining this weight is a moral judgement and one which reflects fundamentally on us as a society. Thus we have chosen as a society through the judgement of our courts to give great weight to the freedom from torture, we have also chosen to weight heavily the freedom from being convicted based on evidence obtained by torture. It is for these reasons that we do not extradite people to countries where they may have their right to freedom from torture infringed. This is a choice we have made even though it presents risks to us, and in the case of suspected terrorists, to our right to life, because of the importance we feel being free from torture has. It is this that has hampered the extradition of Abu Qatada to Jordan.
That we have given this judgement of weight to the courts, to our independent judiciary and to a European Court of Human Rights, is another choice we have made in recognition of the inalienable nature of human rights. Those who drafted the UN Declaration and the European Convention recognised that the choices and actions of democratic societies and their parliaments are by their nature invested with the practical power to make decisions which do not respect those rights.
Like Odysseus we as a society have chosen to bind ourselves to the mast of human rights, although we may hear the calls of the sirens of national security, public safety and popular fears, immigration concerns and retribution for crimes, we have chosen to steer by more fundamental values.
Democracy is not itself the highest and absolute good, and thus neither are necessarily the decisions made through it. It is a manifestation of the fundamental recognition of the inherent worth of the individual as a person capable of freely making their own choices that human rights also protect. It is for this reason that we make the decisions of parliament subject to scrutiny on the basis of that fundamental human value manifested in rights, to ensure that the exercise of free choice in parliament does not fail to respect the weight of the fundamental value and rights of those effected by a law who are often of the minority. It is for this reason that the courts held that Parliament was wrong to detain indefinitely and without trial people strongly suspected to be terrorists who wished us harm. To fail to respect their rights would have been to undermine the foundational value which gives the decisions of parliament their legitimacy.
Thus when we feel the courts have got it wrong we rail against their bonds and argue that they have not given sufficient weight to our concerns and the rights which underlie them. We talk of repealing the Human Rights Act, and of leaving the European Convention. I will not claim that the domestic or European courts always choose the correct balance. They themselves would not claim this either; they have acknowledged in overturning their own decisions in the past that the weighting of rights is a difficult task and one that they do not always get right. But I would not be without the Human Rights Act and the courts. As humans we have freedom but we must not exercise it in a way that destroys it and us.
Should human rights be conditional? Does the Human Rights Act need defending? Comment below or tweet us @PalatiComment
Photo of Amnesty International Report from h de c and the Syria panel from the United Nations Information Service on flickr

