Hard times ahead of Lukashenko

By Josef Škrdlík

Lukashenko might survive, but only at the cost of becoming Putin’s serf.  

Alexander Lukashenko, a Soviet-style leader reigning Belarus since 1994, seems to be in deep trouble. Following the rigged presidential election, the country has been swept by massive civil unrest, driven by a dissatisfaction with Lukashenko’s mismanagement of the economy, oppressive rule and disastrous response to the Covid-19 outbreak.

The protests exploded on Sunday 9 August after the announcement of the election result, crediting Lukashenko with an absurd landslide victory of 80% of the vote. The unrest continued throughout the whole week. Yesterday, tens of thousands took to the streets across all of Belarus in the biggest protests in the country’s history.

Lukashenko, addressing a small crowd of his supporters in Minsk, called the protesters “rats” directed from abroad and accused NATO of amassing on the country’s border.

“I won’t let anyone give away the country, even if I’m dead,” he claimed. 

“Lukashenko’s support base is eroding”

Lukashenko’s support base is eroding. On Thursday and Friday, even employees at state-owned enterprises, once considered the regime’s core supporters, went on strike. Videos of policemen dumping their uniforms and joining the protests are circulating social media. According to the Financial Times, there have also been signs of cracks in the establishment: several high-profile presenters have resigned from state TV and the Belarussian ambassador to Slovakia has expressed his solidarity with protesters.

Will Lukashenko survive?

There appear to be only two ways Lukashenko can suppress the resistance: successful employment of his own security forces, siloviki, or Putin’s support. The realisation of the former is uncertain. On the one hand, siloviki are one of the most privileged and affluent groups in Belarusian society, and would, therefore, have little to gain by withdrawing their support for the president.

On the other hand, some have already deserted and as Alexander Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Center points out, “Siloviki are prepared to give young protesters a good beating, but are far less certain when faced with older factory workers who are closer to them in terms of social strata and worldview.” It is questionable whether Lukashenko still has the security forces under full control. 

Nonetheless, it is not ruled out that if worse comes to worst, Putin will intervene to help him out.

At first glance, the relationship between the two leaders might appear too hostile. In exchange for Russia’s continued economic support, vital for the survival of Belarus’ dysfunctional command economy, Putin has been pressuring Lukashenko into closer integration with Russia. This would be under the concept of the Union State formed in the 1990s, with a hitherto unfulfilled intention to unite the two countries. Lukashenko, afraid of losing sovereignty, and perhaps also his job, has been resisting the pressure, trying to warm up his relationships with the West, thus strengthening his negotiating position against Putin. The dispute escalated at the beginning of this year after Lukashenko rejected the integration deal. Russia temporarily blocked oil exports. Consequently, Lukashenko turned to Norway for oil, and even accepted a state visit by Mike Pompeo. 

That said, it still seems to be in Putin’s best interest to keep Lukashenko in power.

Firstly, Putin, perceiving NATO as an existential threat, is extremely sensitive about the expansion of Western influence into countries neighbouring Russia. This is clear from his 2008 intervention in Georgia, 2014 annexation of Crimea and active support of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. There is no guarantee that post-Lukashenko Belarus would not seek closer ties with the West. Moreover, Putin has shown a persistent tendency to regard civil movements in post-Soviet countries as western subterfuge to weaken Russia’s power. Putin will deem Lukashenko’s survival as essential for ensuring Russia’s national security.

“It still seems to be in Putin’s best interest to keep Lukashenko in power”

Secondly, the success of protests in Belarus could encourage domestic protests in Russia. Putin’s approval ratings fell to a historic low in July this year. Last year’s Moscow protests, as well as current protests in the Far East, show signs of growing discontent with his rule. A potential fall of a closely allied authoritarian leader in a country many Russians feel closely attached to is definitely something to be concerned about.

Finally, if Lukashenko survives, nothing will stop Putin’s plan to integrate the two countries. Lukashenko will be massively indebted to him, cut off from the West and in need of Russia’s economic assistance more than ever before – the only way to at least partially regain the lost legitimacy will be to increase people’s living standards.

Last week, when congratulating Lukashenko on the landslide victory, Putin made clear he has not abandoned the plans. 

“I expect that your statesmanship will facilitate the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations in all spheres, as well as the further enhancement of cooperation within the Union State, the strengthening of integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS and of military-political ties within the Collective Security Treaty Organization.”

After the second call between Lukashenko and Putin about the situation in Belarus yesterday, the Kremlin officially confirmed it was ready to provide Belarus with military support.

Thus, it seems Putin will happily intervene if Lukashenko is unable to stand against the protesters by himself. If this happens, Belarus would not undergo the desired democratization, but instead turn into a de facto Russian province. Nonetheless, the situation in the country is changing very quickly, and the following days are yet to indicate what course the events will take.

Image: Serge Serebro via Wikimedia Commons