China and Taiwan: the coming war?

By Will Holmes

It has become fashionable within national security journalism to talk of war over Taiwan with a sense of inevitability. It is important therefore to understand the roots of the conflict in order to assess the risks present. Too often this process views the potential for conflict through a purely strategic lens, omitting the experience of the millions who live in its menacing shadow. Policy makers and the public need to understand why Taiwan is disputed, and to assess that dispute from the perspective of the participants themselves.

The islands of Taiwan have a complex history. Aside from the indigenous population, the islands host a mix of different ethnic groups from neighbouring China, Japan and Korea. These migrants arrived in several waves over multiple centuries: the most significant at present being the migration of Chinese Nationalists in 1949.

Exiled after their loss in the Chinese Civil War, the nationalist Republic of China (ROC) government fled to Taiwan. In addition to controlling the main island of Taiwan, Formosa, the ROC also controls over a hundred smaller islands, some of which are a mere 10 kilometres from the mainland. The victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set up the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The CCP have long stated their desire to reunite Taiwan and the PRC.

Since 1992 a (somewhat disputed) ‘consensus’ has guided relations between the ROC and PRC. The Consensus states that the ROC and PRC recognize that there is one China but that each side has different interpretations of what China is. This arrangement has
encountered increased scrutiny over the past decade.

The CCP have long stated their desire to reunite Taiwan and the PRC.

There are two key drivers of the present tension. The first is the PRC’s renewed urgency to reunify, by force if necessary. China has become increasingly belligerent on the world stage and has on multiple occasions stated its willingness to use military action to subdue Taiwan if peaceful reunification is not forthcoming. Under the rule of Xi Jinping, the goal of reunification has gained greater prominence.

Increasingly nationalistic Chinese propaganda casts the nation’s history as a story of great rejuvenation. After a century of humiliation at the hands of Imperial Western interests, China has, under the guidance of the CCP, been restored to its rightful place as the ‘Middle Kingdom’. Crucially, this tale of rejuvenation necessarily includes Taiwan.

The presence of a successful democratic ‘China’ just 200 kilometres off the mainland’s coast would severely undermine the PRC’s claim to be responsible for the mainland’s rejuvenation. While the allure of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ wanes as GDP growth slows and inequality increases, the appeal to a more cultural and nationalistic authority will only become more potent. To Beijing, Taiwan is the last piece of the puzzle, a remnant of a shameful past in need of rectification.

The other key driver of tension is Taiwan’s growing cultural distance from China. Until 1987, Taiwan was under the rule of military dictator Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party. Under Chiang, the ROC hoped to unify China under nationalist rule. Imperial Chinese culture was encouraged while other minority ethnic groups and cultures were suppressed.

Since transitioning to a democracy in 1987, previously suppressed ethnic groups have gained a voice, and what it means to be Taiwanese has developed well beyond ‘estranged Chinese’. In 1992 it may have made sense for the ROC to subscribe to ‘one China, two interpretations.’ Nowadays however it makes little sense to call Taiwan China. Taiwanese identity is more diverse and more complex. Moreover, Taiwan’s status as a liberal democracy would make any sort of peaceful reunification with an authoritarian state unfeasible.

Put simply, the PRC and ROC are moving in opposite directions. As the PRC is becoming more authoritarian and nationalist, Taiwan is becoming more democratic and multicultural. This trend is ironically symbolised in the two populations’ differing interpretations of Chiang Kai-shek’s legacy. In Taiwan, Chiang is a complex historical figure, revered by some but viewed by others as a tyrant. In the PRC, however, Chiang is undergoing a transformation from the CCP’s sworn enemy to a nationalist icon, symbolic of China’s great imperial history to which Xi Jinping now appeals.

Given the stark diversion between the PRC and ROC, it is clear that there is no easy path back to just ‘One China’. More worryingly,
a continuation of current trends would surely preclude any chance of peaceful reunification. Both sides are aware of this problem. Fortunately, they are also aware of the cataclysmic consequences of foregoing a peaceful settlement. For the near future at least, we must hope that such awful consequences cannot be overlooked.

Image: Wang Yu Ching via Flickr