Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914

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Review by Jack Hepworth

In the near-century that has passed since the outbreak of the First World War, history has tended to view the conflict with disdain. Wilfred Owen’s famous ‘Dulce et Decorum Est’ dismissed the perception of a gallant death as “The old Lie.” Poets and historians alike have often seen the war as a needless tragedy; the dead as the victims of a pointless slaughter.

An estimated 20 million people died as a consequence of the conflict. For some soldiers, death represented a relief, a “delivery [from] the purgatory” of the trenches. The lives of civilians were shaken, too: from rocketing unemployment in Germany, where soup kitchens abounded, to the disastrous downfall of the Lancashire cotton trade. A “new austerity” pervaded Europe in 1914.

It is, then, an unenviable task for any historian to offer justifications for the First World War, but it is to this challenge that Sir Max Hastings turns his attention. Catastrophe takes up the narrative in July 1914 with an engrossing account of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The work proceeds, in the opening chapters, to assess the causation of the war, and there is no doubt in the author’s mind that the chief culpability for the conflict lies squarely with the Central Powers.

The Hapsburg government “exploited the assassination as a justification for invading Serbia.” Hötzendorf, the Austrian Chief of Staff “had been demanding military action against Serbia” since 1906; the assassination provided the Hapsburg Empire with a casus belli, an opportunity to crush Serbian nationalism. Working in tandem with the Hapsburgs, Germany was a “militarised autocracy” whose high command relished the chance to “challenge Britain.” Moltke “acquiesced in the prospect of a grand European collision.” Hastings’s thesis is simple: Germany and the Hapsburgs sought war to realise their imperial designs; it fell to the Allies to “bear the ghastly cost of resisting.”

Catastrophe goes on to describe the military history of the first months of the war, where Hastings’s crisp prose and occasional penchant for grand rhetoric lend themselves well to an account of the first major battles. At Marne, for instance, Joffre’s men “revealed fortitude at a moment when they might have been forgiven for succumbing to despair.”

This account is one which sympathises with the combatants’ plight without subjecting the key actors in the war to what E. P. Thomson memorably called “the enormous condescension of posterity.” Hastings sees, for example, that Haig could scarcely afford to concern himself with shell-shocked troops at Ypres, where over 54,000 Allied soldiers died: there was “no room for charity towards the weak nor compassion for the afflicted.” Such was the nature of the Great War.

the author displays the same effortless mastery of military affairs that he has developed in previous works

The main body of Catastrophe masterfully describes the military campaigns of late 1914, complete with lucid portraits of the conflict’s key protagonists – General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was “prone to outbursts of extreme temper which caused subordinates to quail.” Throughout this meticulously researched study, the author displays the same effortless mastery of military affairs that he has developed in previous works, many of them on the Second World War.

Hastings takes the opportunity throughout the book to consider the home fronts across wartime Europe, making insightful reference to the rose-tinted propaganda produced by the belligerent governments, and to the “disillusionment”  felt by so many at home. Nobody in Europe, says Hastings, welcomed the war: “rural communities… were dismayed.” Catastrophe acknowledges the civilian hardships caused by the war, from refugees in turmoil in East Prussia, to the looting of private homes and local shops in northern France.

Furthermore, Hastings makes astute reference to the war as the death knell for nineteenth-century liberalism. The Economist feared, in 1914, that the outbreak of war would prove to be the “greatest tragedy in human history.” The Great War sent shockwaves through Western European polities which had, for much of the late-nineteenth century, believed that human history, guided by the spirit of liberalism, was in a stream of continuous progress.

In no way does Hastings deny the cataclysmic consequences of the First World War. Yet the greatest strength of Catastrophe is its clear thesis and strident message: the Allies had no option but to fight German and Hapsburg autocratic militarism. The Germans had to be fought, Catastrophe argues, for their “policy of institutionalised ruthlessness”: the German army killed 312 inhabitants of Leffe – supposed francs-tireurs, French sympathisers – in August 1914. In Eastern Europe, the Austrian military launched shameful programmes against Jews and other minorities. The Germans even used French and Belgians in occupied areas for “slave labour.” Put simply, the Allies “behaved significantly better than did the Central Powers.” Germany was the “immediate aggressor” when it invaded Belgium in August 1914.

To simply dismiss World War One as tragic and futile is, according to Hastings, to “ignore huge practical and moral obstacles.” No single study could do more than his own Catastrophe to bring about a fundamental reassessment of the origins and legacy of the Great War.

Catastrophe: Europe Goes to War 1914, Max Hastings, William Collins

Photograph: Flickr, National Library of Scotland