A New Imperialism? Russia seeks to re-form the Soviet Union

By Finley Grimble

A century ago, when the Communist Revolution seized power in Russia, this enormous landmass became more enigmatic and threatening to the West than ever before. This attitude towards the Kremlin’s agenda has remained intact, reinforced by the recent incident in Salisbury and the Western media’s portrayal of Russia as aggressive and domineering, reinforcing cold war narratives.

Undoubtedly, Putin has sought to extend his authority beyond Russia. Take the Crimean Annexation in 2014, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and many other ‘illegal’ interferences and influence endeavours from Chechnya to Belarus. Amidst these vague condemnations, what is driving Russia is something often forgotten. So, what does Moscow really have in mind for its foreign policy?

When Putin first became president in 2000, he announced that Russia’s foreign policy would be determined by its economic interests, even suggesting in a BBC interview that there was no reason Russia could not join NATO. Sixteen years on, Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept of November 30th 2016 reveals a still reasonable consideration of economic interest, with an emphasis on peaceful methods to further economic development in Russia and its neighbours. As a public document, it’s unlikely to represent Putin’s true intentions, and as such, it would certainly be a shock to read that Russia’s policy is to wage war and further its own interests at the expense of others. It instead talks of Russia’s hopes of strengthening and expanding integration with the EU and the Black Sea nations.

Much of Russia’s foreign policy could be seen as economically driven, as Putin would often have us believe. Georgia is an important strategic area for the transportation of oil. The Ukraine contains miles of pipelines needed to export 50% of Russia’s energy exports to the EU.

However, it would often appear that Putin’s foreign interventions hold a deeper purpose: nationalism. Putin has described the fall of the Soviet Union as a catastrophe, and his efforts could be seen as a desire to revive the Soviet Union as a matter of pride. Russia’s approach towards former satellite states is evident, as the Moscow Times reported in December 2013 that the Ukraine was ‘failing as a state’. That same Foreign Policy Concept of 2016 makes continuous reference to a need to protect what it calls ‘the former Soviet space’. It is intriguing that after almost three decades, an official document of the Foreign Affairs Office would seek to emphasize that connection. More interestingly, ‘the near-abroad’ is being used by Russian nationalists to conceptualise former satellite states – an expression of the connection that Russia feels these former Soviet Republics have to the ‘Motherland’. It should also be noted that near-abroad countries do not use the term, the near-abroad.

Not only does Russia feel it has a right to the territory of the ‘near-abroad’, but also a right to protect ethnically-Russian and Russian-speakers dotted around its lost territories. Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept often reiterates the importance of self-determination, universally, but more specifically to Russian citizens and speakers outside of Russia herself. The annexation of Crimea would best exemplify Russia’s willingness to aggressively pursue an ethno-nationalist driven reconquest of former Soviet space. Though interfering with Ukraine would certainly bring economic benefit to Russia, this rather tiny annexation would appear mostly pride-driven. Many politicians and scholars would be inclined to agree, noting a shift with this ‘reunification’ from a state-driven, to an ethno-nationalist foreign policy.

Understanding this desire within Russian politics allows us to better predict the future moves of the Kremlin. To consider Russia’s legal borders as ‘complete’ is, in the eyes of many (and probably President Putin), not the case at all. To consider the Soviet Union as completely ‘over’ would also be folly, as the imperialistic and nationalistic agenda of Russia to restore those former boundaries still dictates the foreign policy of the Kremlin. Russia is still comparatively weak compared to NATO, but should it recover substantially, and the diplomatic climate permit it, it is difficult to imagine Putin or his successor hesitating to reabsorb the former Soviet Republics in one way or another.

Image by Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation via Wikimedia Commons